Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
What is the mission of epistemology, and what is its proper methodology? Such meta-epistemological questions have been prominent in recent years, especially with the emergence ofvarious brands of naturalistic epistemology. In this paper, I shall reformulate and expand upon my own meta-epistemological conception (most fully articulated in Goldman, 1986), retaining many of its former ingredients while reconfiguring others. The discussion is by no means confined, though, to the meta-epistemological level. New substantive proposals will also be advanced and defended. Let us begin, however, at the meta-epistemological level, by asking what role should be played in epistemology by our ordinary epistemic concepts and principles. By some philosophers' lights, the sole mission of epistemology is to elucidate commonsense epistemic concepts and principles: concepts like knowledge, justification, and rationality, and prin-
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“The reader be warned: the term 'epistemic opacity' 21 does not actually have a univocal and well-defined meaning but refers to a multi-dimensional, plural and (epistemic) context-dependent problem”
From Experts or Authorities? The Strange Case of the Presumed Epistemic Superiority of Artificial Intelligence Systems (2024) · cites this paper as Goldman, 1993
Citations
Cites
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“Another analogy worth mentioning is Kripke's (1980) theory of eference-fixing.”
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Language identification in the limit
Gold, E. M. (1967) · Information and Control · doi:10.1016/s0019-9958(67)91165-5 · Cited by 3,572 · cited 1×
“(This overall conception of epistemology closely parallels the conception of metaphysics articulated in Goldman (1989). The descriptive and normative branches of scientific epistemology are precise analogues of the descriptive and prescriptive branches of metaphysics, as conceptualized there.”
BackgroundContext theory of classification learning
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“tation (cf. Medin and Schaffer, 1978; Smith and Medin, 1981; Hintzman, 1986).”
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Cited by
Pritchard, D. (2005) · doi:10.1093/019928038x.001.0001 · Cited by 874
Justification and the Truth-Connection
Littlejohn, C. (2012) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139060097 · Cited by 530
Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions
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“" (Goldman 1992, 160).”
Highlights of Recent Epistemology
Pryor, J. (2001) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/52.1.95 · Cited by 335
Cassam, Q. (2016) · The Monist · doi:10.1093/monist/onv034 · Cited by 273
Metadata
- Authors
- Goldman, A. I.
- Corresponding author
- Goldman, Alvin I.
- ORCID
- Goldman, Alvin I.
- Venue
- Philosophical Issues
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1993
- Volume
- 3
- Pages
- 271
- ISSN
- 1533-6077 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1569260870
- Cited by
- 170
- References
- 22
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 11 · 2016: 11 · 2015: 15 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 13 · 2012: 15
- FWCI
- 7.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Philosophical Issues (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
- Keywords
- meta-epistemology, naturalized epistemology, epistemic concepts, epistemic principles, knowledge, justification, rationality
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