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Saving the Phenomena
Abstract
A according to a widely shared view of science, scientific theories predict and explain facts about observables: objects and properties which can be perceived by the senses, sometimes augmented by instruments. In the tradition associated with logical positivism, this view receives an influential formulation in terms of a supposed distinction between two kinds of vocabularies and an allied claim about the structure of theories. According to the positivists, facts about observables are reported by means of observation-sentences, expressed in an vocabulary. Explanation, prediction, and theory-testing involve the deduction of observation-sentences from other sentences, some of which may be formulated in a vocabulary, containing terms which do not signify observables. Such deductions are possible because theories also contain correspondence rules that systematically coordinate the terms of the theoretical vocabulary with terms from the observational vocabulary.'
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Citations
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“Thus, when using theoretical or statistical models, one should revisit the phenomena that are the foundations of the models (see also Bogen & Woodward, 1988; Haig, 2013), as well as how they are conceptualized and measured.”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bogen, J., & Woodward, J.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1988-07
- Volume
- 97
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 303
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2038453214
- Cited by
- 938
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 17.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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