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“If non-reductionists like Burge are right, the intelligibility of LLM outputs gives users some warrant for believing these outputs.”
From A phenomenology and epistemology of large language models: transparency, trust, and trustworthiness (2024) · cites this paper as Burge (1993)
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Coliva, A. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197834022.003.0017
Coliva, A. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197834022.003.0003
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Hinges, Prejudices, and Testimonial Injustice
Coliva, A. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197834022.003.0011
Logical Theories are Harder to Abduct
Baggio, M. (2026) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-026-01096-x
The epistemic limits of large language models: trust, testimony, and group understanding
DuVall, P., Rice, C., Kasser, J., & Krishnaswamy, N. (2026) · doi:10.25675/3.027149
Thurow, J. C. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191997341.003.0006
The Alluring Appeal of Minimal Mentalizing
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If Teleology Is the Answer, What Was the Question?
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Theory-Theory vs Simulation Theory
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Jacob, P. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198901297.002.0005
Jacob, P. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198901297.003.0014
Is There a Gulf Between Factive and Non-Factive Human Mentalizing?
Jacob, P. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198901297.003.0011
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Reconciling the Discrepant Developmental Findings
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Testimony, legal epistemology, and #BelieveWomen
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Pollock, J., & Phillips, K. P. (2026) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2026.2733559
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Between Thought and Expression: On Making Sense of Oneself
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Marcus, E. C. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197871102.003.0005
Marcus, E. C. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197871102.003.0004
The Beautiful and the Agreeable
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Marcus, E. C. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197871102.003.0002
Uyar, T. (2026) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2610.38112
It’s OK Just To Believe What AI Says
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Metadata
- Authors
- Burge, T.
- Corresponding author
- Burge, Tyler
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1993-10
- Volume
- 102
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 457
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4234973058
- Cited by
- 929
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 52 · 2025: 103 · 2024: 51 · 2023: 18 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 26 · 2020: 56 · 2019: 62 · 2018: 27 · 2017: 33 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 32 · 2014: 29 · 2013: 31 · 2012: 19
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Philosophical Review (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Conservation › Digital and Traditional Archives Management
- Keywords
- content preservation, philosophy of language
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.