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“If non-reductionists like Burge are right, the intelligibility of LLM outputs gives users some warrant for believing these outputs.”
From A phenomenology and epistemology of large language models: transparency, trust, and trustworthiness (2024) · cites this paper as Burge (1993)
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Metadata
- Authors
- Burge, T.
- Corresponding author
- Burge, Tyler
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1993-10
- Volume
- 102
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 457
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4234973058
- Cited by
- 929
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 52 · 2025: 103 · 2024: 51 · 2023: 18 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 26 · 2020: 56 · 2019: 62 · 2018: 27 · 2017: 33 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 32 · 2014: 29 · 2013: 31 · 2012: 19
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Philosophical Review (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Conservation › Digital and Traditional Archives Management
- Keywords
- content preservation, philosophy of language
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.