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“If non-reductionists like Burge are right, the intelligibility of LLM outputs gives users some warrant for believing these outputs.”
From A phenomenology and epistemology of large language models: transparency, trust, and trustworthiness (2024) · cites this paper as Burge (1993)
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Cited by
Items 701–800 of 944
Peacocke, C. (1999) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0198238606.003.0004
McBride, M. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0104.08
Grajner, M. (2019) · J.B. Metzler eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-476-04632-1_19
Wagenknecht, S. (2016) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/978-1-137-52410-2_8
Greco, J. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108560818.013
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Goldman, A. I. (1999) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0198238207.003.0002
Kelp, C., & Greco, J. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108666404.012
Science, Publicity, and Consciousness
Goldman, A. I. (2002) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195138791.003.0005
Peacocke, C. (1999) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0198238606.003.0008
Majors, B. (2018) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0365
McBride, M. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0104.01
Peacocke, C. (1999) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0198238606.003.0003
Fricker, M. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.003.0009
Peacocke, C. (2003) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199270724.003.0008
O'Brien, L. F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.003.0010
Fia, Q. (2018) · Quaderns de Filosofia · doi:10.7203/qfia.5.2.13427
Bakhurst, D. (2013) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781118721254.ch2
McBride, M. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0104.14
EPISTEMOLOGIA DO TESTEMUNHO: O TESTEMUNHO COMO FONTE DE JUSTIFICAÇÃO
da Silva, R. M. (2014) · Problemata · doi:10.7443/problemata.v5i2.19900
Externalism, Memory, and Self-Knowledge
Kraay, K. J. (2021) · doi:10.32920/14753850.v1
O'Brien, L. F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.003.0001
McBride, M. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0104.11
Wolfensberger, M., & Wrigley, A. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108763479.015
Common Sense and Reliability II
Lemos, N. M. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511498800.004
Kornblith, H. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108682688.005
McBride, M. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0104.07
McKeever, S. D., & Ridge, M. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199290652.003.0005
Peacocke, C. (2003) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199270724.003.0006
Goldman, A. I. (1999) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0198238207.003.0011
Peacocke, C. (1999) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0198238606.003.0007
McKeever, S. D., & Ridge, M. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199290652.003.0009
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Bandini, A. (2018) · Revue philosophique de la France et de l étranger · doi:10.3917/rphi.183.0407
Peacocke, C. (2003) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199270724.003.0010
Matheson, D. (2006) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b0-08-044854-2/01272-4
Luzzi, F. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108649278.008
McKeever, S. D., & Ridge, M. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199290652.003.0003
McBride, M. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0104.12
Goldman, A. I. (1999) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0198238207.003.0004
(2003) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199270724.001.0001.002.003
(2003) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199270724.002.0001
(2003) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199257760.001.0001.002.003
(2003) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199257760.001.0001.002.004
(2002) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195138791.001.0001.002.003
(2002) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195138791.001.0001.002.004
(2002) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195138791.002.0001
(1999) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0198238207.001.0001.002.003
(1999) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0198238207.001.0001.002.004
(1999) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0198238207.002.0001
(2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199290652.001.0001.002.003
(2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.002.0003
(2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.002.0005
(2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199290652.001.0001.002.004
(2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.002.0004
(2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199290652.005.0001
(1999) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0198238606.002.0001
(2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.002.0004
(1999) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0198238606.001.0001.002.003
(2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.002.0003
(2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.002.0003
Kamiyama, K. (2009) · Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.4288/kisoron.37.1_19
Almassi, B. (2022) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_1042-1
Helliwell, J. R. (2022) · Journal of Applied Crystallography · doi:10.1107/s1600576722010950
Revisiting ‘The New 4CT Problem’
McEvoy, M. (2022) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-19071-2_38-1
(2021) · Odile Jacob eBooks · doi:10.3917/oj.prous.2021.01.0293
Introduction: Instruments of Futures Past
Alvarado, R. (2023) · Synthese Library/Synthese library · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-38647-3_1
Implications of the Instruments View of Computer Simulation
Alvarado, R. (2023) · Synthese Library/Synthese library · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-38647-3_7
ประเด็นทางญาณวิทยาในแนวคิดเรื่องชุมชนแห่งการสืบเสาะของแมทธิว ลิปแมน
ครองยุทธ, ณ. (2017) · Chula Digiverse · doi:10.58837/chula.the.2017.1037
Trust Logic, Not TortoisesPreprint
Beverley, J. (2023) · OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31219/osf.io/8c53m
Just How Testimonial, Epistemic, Or Correctable Is Testimonial Injustice?
Auerback, R. (2023) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781003396789-8
Foster, M., Arvand, H., Graham, H. T., & Bedford, D. (2023) · Emerald Group Publishing Limited eBooks · doi:10.1108/978-1-83982-930-720231001
Almassi, B. (2023) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-6519-1_1042
Bar‐On, D., & Wright, C. (2023) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781394266524.index
Bar‐On, D., & Wright, C. (2023) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781394266524.biblio
What’s So Special About Reasoning? Rationality, Belief Updating, and Internalism
Munroe, W. (2024) · Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.3998/ergo.5182 · Cited by 2
A game-theoretical and experimental approach to expert-based knowledge
Colo, P. (2021) · theses.fr (ABES) · doi:10.70675/72f4c89cz743az4b5ezb254z7a19112f3b46
Sbisà, M. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191927096.003.0009
Sbisà, M. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191927096.003.0004
Sbisà, M. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191927096.003.0002
Sbisà, M. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191927096.003.0005
Sbisà, M. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191927096.003.0017
Sbisà, M. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191927096.003.0007
Sbisà, M. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191927096.003.0013
Sbisà, M. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191927096.003.0014
Sbisà, M. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191927096.003.0003
Abbreviations of Works by J.L. Austin
Sbisà, M. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191927096.002.0005
Sbisà, M. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191927096.003.0010
Sbisà, M. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191927096.002.0004
Sbisà, M. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191927096.003.0012
Sbisà, M. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191927096.003.0011
Revisiting “The New 4CT Problem”
McEvoy, M. (2024) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-40846-5_38
Liggins, D. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191997464.003.0001
Liggins, D. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191997464.003.0009
Alethic nihilism as an error theory
Liggins, D. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191997464.003.0004
Liggins, D. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191997464.003.0010
Liggins, D. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191997464.003.0008
Liggins, D. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191997464.003.0005
The superiority of the nihilist solutions to the paradoxes
Liggins, D. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191997464.003.0003
Alethic nihilism against paradox
Liggins, D. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191997464.003.0002
Further objections to nihilism
Liggins, D. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191997464.003.0006
Metadata
- Authors
- Burge, T.
- Corresponding author
- Burge, Tyler
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1993-10
- Volume
- 102
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 457
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4234973058
- Cited by
- 929
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 52 · 2025: 103 · 2024: 51 · 2023: 18 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 26 · 2020: 56 · 2019: 62 · 2018: 27 · 2017: 33 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 32 · 2014: 29 · 2013: 31 · 2012: 19
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Philosophical Review (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Conservation › Digital and Traditional Archives Management
- Keywords
- content preservation, philosophy of language
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.