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Cited by 1,409Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceEpistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsMental Health and Psychiatry

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The Intrinsic Quality of Experience

Harman, Gilbert·1990·Philosophical Perspectives
DOI 10.2307/2214186
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Abstract

There are three familiar and related arguments against psychophysical functionalism and the computer model of the mind. The first is that we are directly aware of intrinsic features of our experience and argues that there is no way to account for this awareness in a functional view. The second claims that a person blind from birth can know all about the functional role of visual experience without knowing what it is like to see something red. The third claims that functionalism cannot account for the possibility of an inverted spectrum. All three arguments can be defused by distinguishing properties of the object of experience from properties of the experience of an object.

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Crossref · 10.2307/2214186

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18 of 18 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Metadata

Authors
Harman, G.
Corresponding author
Harman, Gilbert
Venue
Philosophical Perspectives
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1990
Volume
4
Pages
31
ISSN
1520-8583 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.2307/2214186
OpenAlex
W2035834232
Cited by
1,409
References
18
Citations by year
2026: 37 · 2025: 70 · 2024: 83 · 2023: 69 · 2022: 94 · 2021: 67 · 2020: 69 · 2019: 86 · 2018: 39 · 2017: 62 · 2016: 50 · 2015: 35 · 2014: 35 · 2013: 46 · 2012: 34
FWCI
18.62
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Philosophical Perspectives (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
Keywords
qualia, inverted spectrum, visual experience, color perception

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