The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Nature of Psychological Explanation.
Abstract
In exploring the nature of psychological explanation, this book looks at how psychologists theorize about the human ability to calculate, to speak a language and the like. It shows how good theorizing explains or tries to explain such abilities as perception and cognition. It recasts the familiar explanations of intelligence and cognitive capacity as put forward by philosophers such as Fodor, Dennett, and others in terms of a theory of explanation that makes established doctrine more intelligible to professionals and their students.In particular, the book shows that vestigial adherence to the positivists' D-N model has distorted the view of philosophers of science about what psychologists (and biologists) do and has masked the real nature of explanation. Major sections in the book cover Analysis and Subsumption; Functional Analysis; Understanding Cognitive Capacities; and Historical Reflections.Robert Cummins is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle. A Bradford Book.
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Cites
Searle, J. R. (1980) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00005756 · Cited by 6,954
Fodor, J. A. (1975) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 4,588
“Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap
Levine, J. (1983) · Pacific Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.1983.tb00207.x · Cited by 2,150
From folk psychology to cognitive science: The case against belief.
Stich, S. P. (1983) · Cited by 1,020
The nature and plausibility of Cognitivism
Haugeland, J. (1978) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00074148 · Cited by 512
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Social Theory of International Politics
Wendt, A. (1999) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511612183 · Cited by 7,664
Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis
Fodor, J. A., & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1988) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(88)90031-5 · Cited by 4,022
Morgeson, F. P., & Hofmann, D. A. (1999) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/259081 · Cited by 1,218
Mechanisms and the nature of causation
Glennan, S. (1996) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/bf00172853 · Cited by 894
The Validity of Idiographic Research Explanations
Tsoukas, H. (1989) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/258558 · Cited by 788
Metadata
- Authors
- Harre, R., & Cummins, R.
- Venue
- Noûs
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1985-09
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 473
- ISSN
- 0029-4624 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2088253932
- Cited by
- 603
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 79.51
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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