The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Nature of Psychological Explanation.
Abstract
In exploring the nature of psychological explanation, this book looks at how psychologists theorize about the human ability to calculate, to speak a language and the like. It shows how good theorizing explains or tries to explain such abilities as perception and cognition. It recasts the familiar explanations of intelligence and cognitive capacity as put forward by philosophers such as Fodor, Dennett, and others in terms of a theory of explanation that makes established doctrine more intelligible to professionals and their students.In particular, the book shows that vestigial adherence to the positivists' D-N model has distorted the view of philosophers of science about what psychologists (and biologists) do and has masked the real nature of explanation. Major sections in the book cover Analysis and Subsumption; Functional Analysis; Understanding Cognitive Capacities; and Historical Reflections.Robert Cummins is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle. A Bradford Book.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Searle, J. R. (1980) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00005756 · Cited by 6,954
Fodor, J. A. (1975) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 4,588
“Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap
Levine, J. (1983) · Pacific Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.1983.tb00207.x · Cited by 2,150
From folk psychology to cognitive science: The case against belief.
Stich, S. P. (1983) · Cited by 1,020
The nature and plausibility of Cognitivism
Haugeland, J. (1978) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00074148 · Cited by 512
Cited by
Social Theory of International Politics
Wendt, A. (1999) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511612183 · Cited by 7,664
Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis
Fodor, J. A., & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1988) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(88)90031-5 · Cited by 4,022
Morgeson, F. P., & Hofmann, D. A. (1999) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/259081 · Cited by 1,218
Mechanisms and the nature of causation
Glennan, S. (1996) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/bf00172853 · Cited by 894
The Validity of Idiographic Research Explanations
Tsoukas, H. (1989) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/258558 · Cited by 788
Is There Teaching in Nonhuman Animals?
Caro, T. M., & Hauser, M. D. (1992) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/417553 · Cited by 606
Communication, Organizing and Organization: An Overview and Introduction to the Special Issue
Cooren, F., Kuhn, T., Cornelissen, J. P., & Clark, T. (2011) · Organization Studies · doi:10.1177/0170840611410836 · Cited by 585
Précis of Relevance: Communication and Cognition
Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1987) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00055345 · Cited by 541
Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches
Piccinini, G., & Craver, C. (2011) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-011-9898-4 · Cited by 508
When mechanistic models explain
Craver, C. F. (2006) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9097-x · Cited by 504
Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness
Levine, J. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0195132351.001.0001 · Cited by 470
Cognitive and Sociocultural Perspectives: Two Parallel SLA Worlds?
Zuengler, J., & Miller, E. R. (2006) · TESOL Quarterly · doi:10.2307/40264510 · Cited by 444
Functional Analysis and Proper Functions
GRIFFITHS, P. E. (1993) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/44.3.409 · Cited by 383
Folk Psychology: Simulation or Tacit Theory?
STICH, S., & NICHOLS, S. (1992) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1992.tb00196.x · Cited by 376
Is memory for remembering? Recollection as a form of episodic hypothetical thinking
De Brigard, F. (2014) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-013-0247-7 · Cited by 369
Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory Exclusion
Kim, J. (1989) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.2307/2214264 · Cited by 337
Misrepresenting & malfunctioning
Neander, K. (1995) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/bf00989706 · Cited by 334
Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie's Vade-Mecum
FODOR, J. A. (1985) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/xciv.373.76 · Cited by 319
Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture
Fodor, J. A., & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1993) · Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5782.003.0045 · Cited by 305
Function without purpose: The uses of causal role function in evolutionary biology
Amundson, R., & Lauder, G. V. (1994) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/bf00850375 · Cited by 290
What Happened to Mirror Neurons?
Heyes, C., & Catmur, C. (2022) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691621990638 · Cited by 286
When Other Things Aren't Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws from Vacuity
Pietroski, P., & Rey, G. (1995) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/46.1.81 · Cited by 267
What Biological Functions Are and Why They Matter
Garson, J. (2019) · doi:10.1017/9781108560764 · Cited by 239
Spontaneous tool use and sensorimotor intelligence in Cebus compared with other monkeys and apes
Chevalier-Skolnikoff, S. (1989) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00057678 · Cited by 155
On the axiomatic foundations of the integrated information theory of consciousness
Bayne, T. (2018) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niy007 · Cited by 132
Empirical perspectives from the self-model theory of subjectivity: a brief summary with examples
Metzinger, T. (2007) · Progress in Brain Research · doi:10.1016/s0079-6123(07)68018-2 · Cited by 123
Commonsense concepts of phenomenal consciousness: does anyone care about functional zombies?
Huebner, B. (2010) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-009-9126-6 · Cited by 72
The Nature of Physical Computation
Shagrir, O. (2022) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197552384.001.0001 · Cited by 70
Plantinga on functions and the theory of evolution
Levin, M. (1997) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048409712347691 · Cited by 29
Apples and oranges: The pitfalls of comparative intelligence
Savage, A., & Snowdon, C. T. (1989) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00057897 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Harre, R., & Cummins, R.
- Venue
- Noûs
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1985-09
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 473
- ISSN
- 0029-4624 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2088253932
- Cited by
- 603
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 79.51
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.