Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Graham Loomes, Robert Sugden; Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty, The Economic Journal, Volume 92, Issue 368, 1 Dece
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Although there would only be cause for regret when personalization leads to higher prices, loss aversion implies that people are inclined to give this scenario more weight.”
From Online Price Discrimination and EU Data Privacy Law (2017) · cites this paper as Loomes and Sugden 1982
Citations
Cites
Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1988) · Decision, Probability and Utility · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609220.014 · Cited by 32,474
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7455683 · Cited by 18,497
(2001) · Empirical Direction in Design and Analysis · doi:10.4324/9781410600004-24 · Cited by 6,808
Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Trade-Offs
Keeney, R. L., & Raiffa, H. (1993) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174084 · Cited by 4,426
Allais, M. (1953) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1907921 · Cited by 4,112
The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk
Friedman, M., & Savage, L. J. (1948) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/256692 · Cited by 3,077
Regret in Decision Making under Uncertainty
Bell, D. E. (1982) · Operations Research · doi:10.1287/opre.30.5.961 · Cited by 2,977
The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence and Limitations
Schoemaker, P. J. H. (2007) · Journal of Economic Literature · Cited by 1,873
Markowitz, H. (1952) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/257177 · Cited by 1,771
Reversals of preference between bids and choices in gambling decisions.
Lichtenstein, S., & Slovic, P. (1971) · Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0031207 · Cited by 1,570
"Expected Utility" Analysis without the Independence Axiom
Machina, M. J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912631 · Cited by 1,517
The Theory of Statistical Decision
Savage, L. J. (1951) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.1080/01621459.1951.10500768 · Cited by 1,223
Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon
Grether, D. M., & Plott, C. R. (2006) · The Construction of Preference · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511618031.006 · Cited by 1,173
The Theory of Statistical Decision
Savage, L. J. (1951) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2280094 · Cited by 787
Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1974) · Behavioral Science · doi:10.1002/bs.3830190603 · Cited by 599
Nontransitive measurable utility
Fishburn, P. C. (1982) · Journal of Mathematical Psychology · doi:10.1016/0022-2496(82)90034-7 · Cited by 494
Investment Decision under Uncertainty: Applications of the State-Preference Approach
Hirshleifer, J. (1966) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1880692 · Cited by 382
Translation of Gambles and Aspiration Level Effects in Risky Choice Behavior
Payne, J. W., Laughhunn, D. J., & Crum, R. (1980) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.26.10.1039 · Cited by 341
Risk Taking and Problem Context in the Domain of Losses: An Expected Utility Analysis
Hershey, J. C., & Schoemaker, P. J. H. (1980) · The Journal of Risk and Insurance · doi:10.2307/252685 · Cited by 274
Inconsistent preferences among gambles.
Lindman, H. R. (1971) · Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0031208 · Cited by 256
Prospect theory's reflection hypothesis: A critical examination
Hershey, J. C., & Schoemaker, P. J. H. (1980) · Organizational Behavior and Human Performance · doi:10.1016/0030-5073(80)90037-9 · Cited by 215
A rationale for preference reversal
Loomes, G. (1983) · Cited by 167
Self-citationExperiments on Decisions under Risk: The Expected Utility Hypothesis
Schoemaker, P. J. H. (1980) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-017-5040-0 · Cited by 165
Morgenstern, O. (1979) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7629-1_6 · Cited by 88
Moskowitz, H. (1974) · Decision Sciences · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5915.1974.tb00610.x · Cited by 80
Arrow's theorem, the paradox of social choice
MacKay, A. F. (1980) · Cited by 55
Cited by
Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00122574 · Cited by 15,467
“It is noteworthy that the violations of independence reported in tables 1 and 2 are also inconsistent with regret theory, advanced by Loomes and Sugden (1982, 1987), and with Fishburn's (1988) SSA model.”
ResultLoewenstein, G. F., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K., & Welch, N. (2001) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.127.2.267 · Cited by 5,955
“Several J/DM theories of risky choice provide a prominent role for such emotions, which include the disappointment or regret that might arise from counterfactual comparisons (Bell, 1982, 1985; Loomes & Sugden, 1982, 1986; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997; Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999).”
Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2000) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00003435 · Cited by 2,762
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293 · Cited by 3,991
RATIONAL CHOICE AND THE FRAMING OF DECISIONS
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1988) · Decision Making · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511598951.011 · Cited by 3,712
Metadata
- Authors
- Loomes, G., & Sugden, R.
- Affiliations
- University of Newcastle Australia (AU)
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1982-12
- Volume
- 92
- Issue
- 368
- Pages
- 805
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2040689732
- Cited by
- 4,042
- References
- 25
- Citations by year
- 2026: 134 · 2025: 186 · 2024: 229 · 2023: 165 · 2022: 166 · 2021: 191 · 2020: 186 · 2019: 163 · 2018: 166 · 2017: 140 · 2016: 136 · 2015: 157 · 2014: 139 · 2013: 140 · 2012: 154
- FWCI
- 9.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Economic Journal (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic and Environmental Valuation
- Keywords
- regret theory, decision-making, expected utility, risk preferences, loss aversion
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.