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Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
Abstract
Journal Article Instability of Simple Dynamic Games Get access Norman Schofield Norman Schofield University of Texas at Austin Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 45, Issue 3, October 1978, Pages 575–594, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297259 Published: 01 October 1978 Article history Received: 01 January 1976 Accepted: 01 April 1977 Published: 01 October 1978
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Schofield, N.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1978-10-01
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 575-594
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W2003110454
- Cited by
- 500
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 10.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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