The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Information Reliability and a Theory of Financial Intermediation
Abstract
This paper is an analysis of when it will be beneficial for agents engaged in the production of information to form coalitions. The model is cast in a financial market framework, thus leading to an identification of conditions sufficient for the existence of financial intermediaries. Intermediation is shown to improve welfare if informational asymmetries are present, and the information generated to rectify these asymmetries is potentially unreliable. The usual appeal to transactions costs to explain intermediation is not needed.
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Citations
Cites
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Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
Holmstrom, B. (1982) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003457 · Cited by 4,903
The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive‐Signalling Approach,
Ross, S. A. (1977) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003485 · Cited by 4,168
INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
Brealey, R., Leland, H. E., & Pyle, D. H. (1977) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03277.x · Cited by 4,055
On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets
Stiglitz, J. E., & Grossman, S. J. (1980) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8765r99 · Cited by 3,645
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
Townsend, R. M. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0 · Cited by 3,204
Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and "The Bird in the Hand" Fallacy
Bhattacharya, S. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003330 · Cited by 2,804
ON THE EFFICIENCY OF COMPETITIVE STOCK MARKETS WHERE TRADES HAVE DIVERSE INFORMATION
Grossman, S. (1976) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01907.x · Cited by 1,437
The Theory of Screening, Education, and the Distribution of Income
Stiglitz, J. E. (1975) · Columbia Academic Commons (Columbia University) · doi:10.7916/d8pg22pm · Cited by 1,353
Competitive and optimal responses to signals: An analysis of efficiency and distribution
Spence, M. (1974) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(74)90098-2 · Cited by 624
Alternative approaches to the theory of the banking firm
Baltensperger, E. (1980) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3932(80)90016-1 · Cited by 418
A TRANSACTIONS COST APPROACH TO THE THEORY OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
Scholes, M., Benston, G. J., & Smith, C. W. (1976) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01882.x · Cited by 375
Nondissipative Signaling Structures and Dividend Policy
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Cited by
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476
N. Berger, A., & F. Udell, G. (1998) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(98)00038-7 · Cited by 3,690
“…that the modem theory of financial intermediation --which motivates intermediaries as delegated monitors on behalf of investors (e.g., Diamond 1984, Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984, and Boyd and Prescott 1986) --is mostly a theory that applies to the provision of intermediated finance in private…”
Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence
Levine, R. (2004) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w10766 · Cited by 3,545
Chapter 12 Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence
Levine, R. (2005) · Handbook of Economic Growth · doi:10.1016/s1574-0684(05)01012-9 · Cited by 2,889
Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?
Boot, A. W. A. (2000) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1006/jfin.2000.0282 · Cited by 2,354
Metadata
- Authors
- Ramakrishnan, R. T. S., & Thakor, A. V.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1984-07
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 415
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2096543326
- Cited by
- 1,160
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 22.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.