The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Theory of Credibility
Abstract
This paper presents models in which one agent must decide whether to trust another, whose motives are uncertain. Reliability can only be communicated through actions. In this context, it pays for people to build a reputation based on reliable behaviour; someone becomes credible by consistently providing accurate and valuable information or by performing useful services. The theory provides a justification for long-term arrangements without binding contracts. It also describes those situations where it pays an agent to cash in on his reputation.
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Citations
Cites
Strategic information transmission
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
Self-citationReputation and imperfect information
Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8 · Cited by 3,087
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 · Cited by 2,494
Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90031-x · Cited by 1,846
Reputations in games and markets
Wilson, R. (1985) · Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528309.004 · Cited by 380
On The Theory of DelegationPreprint
Holmstrom, B. R. (1980) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 181
A two-person game of information transmission
Green, J. R., & Stokey, N. L. (2006) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2003.08.007 · Cited by 124
Cited by
Lupia, A. (1994) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2944882 · Cited by 1,850
Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations
(1986) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036907 · Cited by 1,214
Sobel, J. (2002) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/0022051027001 · Cited by 1,000
Self-citationThe relationship of reputation and credibility to brand success
Herbig, P., & Milewicz, J. (1993) · Journal of Consumer Marketing · doi:10.1108/eum0000000002601 · Cited by 655
Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model
Camerer, C., & Weigelt, K. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911840 · Cited by 572
Metadata
- Authors
- Sobel, J.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1985-10
- Volume
- 52
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 557
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1980165907
- Cited by
- 543
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 4.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.