The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
Abstract
Consumption data generally indicates that consumption risk is not perfectly diversified across individuals. This paper considers if and when imperfect diversification is a feature of efficient allocations in a symmetric information environment without commitment. It shows that if individuals are sufficiently patient, imperfect diversification is always sub-optimal in the long run; however, if individuals are not so patient, imperfect diversification is always optimal. The paper goes on to demonstrate that the way that history matters in an efficient allocation in a symmetric-information/no-commitment environment can be used to distinguish lack of commitment from other possible rationalizations of imperfect risk sharing, such as efficiency in the presence of asymmetric information.
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Citations
Cites
Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics
Stokey, N. L., Lucas, R. E., & Prescott, E. C. (1989) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctvjnrt76 · Cited by 3,031
Risk and Insurance In Village India
Townsend, R. M., & Townsend, R. (1991) · AgEcon Search (University of Minnesota, USA) · doi:10.22004/ag.econ.294664 · Cited by 1,583
On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
Abreu, D. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911077 · Cited by 1,252
Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1998) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355398555496 · Cited by 1,020
A Simple Test of Consumption Insurance
Cochrane, J. H. (1991) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261785 · Cited by 947
Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
Ligon, E., Thomas, J. P., & Worrall, T. (2002) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00204 · Cited by 653
Reciprocity without commitment
Coate, S., & Ravallion, M. (1993) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3878(93)90102-s · Cited by 651
On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
Spear, S. E., & Srivastava, S. (1987) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297484 · Cited by 637
Renegotiation in repeated games
Farrell, J., & Maskin, E. (1989) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/0899-8256(89)90021-3 · Cited by 602
Thomas, J., & Worrall, T. (1988) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297404 · Cited by 436
Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
Thomas, J., & Worrall, T. (1990) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(90)90023-d · Cited by 362
Communication, commitment, and growth
Marcet, A., & Marimon, R. (1992) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(92)90054-l · Cited by 214
Cited by
Risk-sharing networks in rural Philippines
Fafchamps, M., & Lund, S. (2003) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3878(03)00029-4 · Cited by 1,211
Does Income Inequality Lead to Consumption Inequality? Evidence and Theory1
KRUEGER, D., & PERRI, F. (2006) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.00373.x · Cited by 777
Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default
Alvarez, F., & Jermann, U. J. (2000) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00137 · Cited by 729
Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
Ligon, E., Thomas, J. P., & Worrall, T. (2002) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00204 · Cited by 653
A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default
Chatterjee, S., Corbae, D., Nakajima, M., & Ríos-Rull, J.-V. (2007) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00806.x · Cited by 572
Metadata
- Authors
- Kocherlakota, N. R.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1996-10-01
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 595-609
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W2100037494
- Cited by
- 727
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 7.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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