The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
Abstract
Consumption data generally indicates that consumption risk is not perfectly diversified across individuals. This paper considers if and when imperfect diversification is a feature of efficient allocations in a symmetric information environment without commitment. It shows that if individuals are sufficiently patient, imperfect diversification is always sub-optimal in the long run; however, if individuals are not so patient, imperfect diversification is always optimal. The paper goes on to demonstrate that the way that history matters in an efficient allocation in a symmetric-information/no-commitment environment can be used to distinguish lack of commitment from other possible rationalizations of imperfect risk sharing, such as efficiency in the presence of asymmetric information.
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Citations
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Fernández-Villaverde, J., & Krueger, D. (2011) · Macroeconomic Dynamics · doi:10.1017/s1365100510000180 · Cited by 388
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“Family pressures to spend on extended household consumption are especially strong in Africa and developing countries in general (Grimm, Hartwig, & Lay, 2013; Jakiela & Ozier, 2014; Kocherlakota, 1996; Townsend, 1994).”
BackgroundProductivity Shocks, Long-Term Contracts, and Earnings Dynamics
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Metadata
- Authors
- Kocherlakota, N. R.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1996-10-01
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 595-609
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W2100037494
- Cited by
- 727
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 7.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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