The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Corporate Control, Portfolio Choice, and the Decline of Banking
Abstract
In the 1980s, U.S. banks became systematically less profitable and riskier as nonbank competition eroded the profitability of banks' traditional activities. Bank failures rose exponentially during this decade. The leading explanation for the persistence of these trends centers on fixed-rate deposit insurance: the insurance gives bank equityholders an incentive to take on risk when the value of bank charters falls. We propose and test an alternative explanation based on corporate control considerations. We show that managerial entrenchment played a more important role than did the moral hazard associated with deposit insurance in explaining the recent behavior of the banking industry.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
How does foreign entry affect domestic banking markets?
Claessens, S., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Huizinga, H. (2001) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(00)00102-3 · Cited by 1,644
Berger, A. N., & Bonaccorsi di Patti, E. (2006) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2005.05.015 · Cited by 1,033
Ownership structure, risk and performance in the European banking industry
Iannotta, G., Nocera, G., & Sironi, A. (2007) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.07.013 · Cited by 984
Universal banking and the performance of German firms
Gorton, G., & Schmid, F. A. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00066-0 · Cited by 678
Self-citationRegulating the Shadow Banking System
Gorton, G., & Metrick, A. (2010) · Brookings Papers on Economic Activity · doi:10.1353/eca.2010.0016 · Cited by 561
Self-citationWhere do merger gains come from? Bank mergers from the perspective of insiders and outsiders
Houston, J. F., James, C. M., & Ryngaert, M. D. (2001) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(01)00046-0 · Cited by 558
Consolidation and efficiency in the financial sector: A review of the international evidence
Amel, D., Barnes, C., Panetta, F., & Salleo, C. (2004) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2003.10.013 · Cited by 526
Ownership structure and risk in publicly held and privately owned banks
Barry, T. A., Lepetit, L., & Tarazi, A. (2011) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.10.004 · Cited by 426
Bank Bailouts and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Germany
Dam, L., & Koetter, M. (2012) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhs056 · Cited by 392
Too Many to Fail? Evidence of Regulatory Forbearance When the Banking Sector Is Weak
Brown, C. O., & Dinç, I. S. (2011) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhp039 · Cited by 390
Are capital buffers pro-cyclical?
Ayuso, J., Pérez, D., & Saurina, J. (2004) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/s1042-9573(03)00044-5 · Cited by 384
The cyclical behaviour of European bank capital buffers
Jokipii, T., & Milne, A. (2008) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.12.001 · Cited by 380
The Politics of Bank Failures: Evidence from Emerging Markets
Brown, C. O., & Dinc, I. S. (2005) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355305775097506 · Cited by 335
Bank capital buffer and risk adjustment decisions
Jokipii, T., & Milne, A. (2011) · Journal of Financial Stability · doi:10.1016/j.jfs.2010.02.002 · Cited by 304
Business Administration, Y. U., Tubaishat*, H., Faouri, R., Public Administration, Y. U., Alshammari, H., & Business Administration, Y. U. (2021) · International Journal of Management and Humanities · doi:10.35940/ijmh.g1262.035721 · Cited by 4
Metadata
- Authors
- Gorton, G., & Rosen, R.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1995-12
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1377
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4300500627
- Cited by
- 186
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 13.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.