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Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives
Abstract
Oliver E. Williamson University of California, Berkeley This paper combines institutional economics with aspects of contract law and organization theory to identify and explicate the key differences that distinguish three generic forms of economic organization-market, hybrid, and hierarchy. The analysis shows that the three generic forms are distinguished by different coordinating and control mechanisms and by different abilities to adapt to disturbances. Also, each generic form is supported and defined by a distinctive type of contract law. The costeffective choice of organization form is shown to vary systematically with the attributes of transactions. The paper unifies two hitherto disjunct areas of institutional economics-the institutional environment and the institutions of governance-by treating the institutional environment as a locus of parameters, changes in which parameters bring about shifts in the comparative costs of governance. Changes in property rights, contract law, reputation effects, and uncertainty are investigated.'
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“The TCE approach (Williamson, 1979(Williamson, , 1991) ) and the social embeddedness perspective (Granovetter, 1985) have had a central role in framing most definitions of cooperation that focus on attitude.”
From Collaboration, Coordination, and Cooperation Among Organizations: Establishing the Distinctive Meanings of These Terms Through a Systematic Literature Review (2020) · cites this paper as Williamson, 1991
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Metadata
- Authors
- Williamson, O. E.
- Corresponding author
- Williamson, Oliver E.
- Venue
- Administrative Science Quarterly
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1991-06
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 269
- ISSN
- 0001-8392 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2109280325
- Cited by
- 7,151
- References
- 56
- Citations by year
- 2026: 138 · 2025: 111 · 2024: 175 · 2023: 218 · 2022: 224 · 2021: 299 · 2020: 253 · 2019: 262 · 2018: 271 · 2017: 275 · 2016: 238 · 2015: 293 · 2014: 312 · 2013: 351 · 2012: 356
- FWCI
- 99.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Administrative Science Quarterly (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Management Information Systems › Outsourcing and Supply Chain Management
- Keywords
- market organization, hybrid organizations, hierarchy, coordination mechanisms, control mechanisms, organizational adaptation, contract law, property rights, reputation effects, uncertainty, transaction costs, governance costs, institutional environment, organizational form choice
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