The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Disclosure of Nonproprietary Information
Abstract
In this paper, I provide two theories about why management might withhold information which is not proprietary, together with an analysis of the consequences of altering various assumptions underlying these theories. Proprietary information is considered here as any information whose disclosure potentially alters a firm's future earnings gross of senior management's compensation.' Even if a manager's private information is proprietary, shareholders may benefit occasionally from having this information disclosed (see Verrecchia [1983] and Dye [1984a]), although obvious explanations exist for the rarity of such disclosures. However, it is commonly believed that managers possess information about the firms they run, such as annual earnings' forecasts, whose release would affect the prices of their firms, but not the distribution of their firms' future
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Cites
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Voluntary financial disclosure in an entry game with continua of types*
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Peters, G. F., & Romi, A. M. (2013) · Journal of Accounting and Public Policy · doi:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2013.04.004 · Cited by 158
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Heflin, F., & Wallace, D. (2017) · Journal of Business Finance & Accounting · doi:10.1111/jbfa.12244 · Cited by 116
Corporate voluntary carbon disclosure strategy and carbon performance in the USA
Datt, R. R., Luo, L., & Tang, Q. (2019) · Accounting Research Journal · doi:10.1108/arj-02-2017-0031 · Cited by 103
Enache, L., & Hussainey, K. (2020) · Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting · doi:10.1007/s11156-019-00794-8 · Cited by 91
Decoding the impact of firm‐level ESG performance on financial disclosure quality
Ferdous, L. T., Rana, T., & Yeboah, R. (2025) · Business Strategy and the Environment · doi:10.1002/bse.3982 · Cited by 46
Gros, M., & Koch, S. (2019) · Corporate Ownership and Control · doi:10.22495/cocv16i1c1art4 · Cited by 5
A Review of Corporate Reporting Transparency Quality: Current Status and Future Directions
Hewage, Y. M., Cooray, A., & Ahmed, R. (2026) · Australian Accounting Review · doi:10.1111/auar.70019 · Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Dye, R. A.
- Venue
- Journal of Accounting Research
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1985
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 123
- ISSN
- 0021-8456 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2324400225
- Cited by
- 1,905
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 15.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.