The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Product-Market Competition and Managerial Slack
Abstract
This article analyzes the effect of product-market competition on managerial incentives. In contrast to Hart (1983a), I show that competition may actually exacerbate the incentive problem. The difference in results derives from our different assumptions about managerial preferences. The importance of assumptions about preferences suggests that we do not yet understand the precise mechanism through which competition affects incentives.
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Cites
Holmstrom, B. (1982) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003457 · Cited by 4,903
Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
Baron, D. P., & Myerson, R. B. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912769 · Cited by 1,721
The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme
Hart, O. D. (1983) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003639 · Cited by 1,499
The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
Dasgupta, P., Hammond, P., & Maskin, E. (1979) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297045 · Cited by 809
Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
Sappington, D. (1983) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90120-5 · Cited by 519
THEORIES OF THE FIRM: MARGINALIST, BEHAVIORAL, MANAGERIAL
Machlup, F. (1978) · Methodology of Economics and Other Social Sciences · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-464550-9.50027-3 · Cited by 433
Information, Competition, and Markets
Stiglitz, J. E., & Nalebuff, B. (1983) · American Economic Review · doi:10.7916/d83b6946 · Cited by 358
Machlup, F. (1967) · American Economic Review · Cited by 256
Cited by
Competition and innovation: an inverted U relationship
Blundell, R., Howitt, P., Griffith, R., Aghion, P., & Bloom, N. (2002) · Working Paper Series · doi:10.1920/wp.ifs.2002.0204 · Cited by 2,109
Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition
Schmidt, K. M. (1997) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2971709 · Cited by 1,177
Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, and Equity Prices
GIROUD, X., & MUELLER, H. M. (2011) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01642.x · Cited by 1,167
Does corporate governance matter in competitive industries?
Giroud, X., & Mueller, H. M. (2010) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2009.10.008 · Cited by 1,037
Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship*
Aghion, P., Bloom, N., Blundell, R., Griffith, R., & Howitt, P. (2005) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/0033553053970214 · Cited by 995
Metadata
- Authors
- Scharfstein, D.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1988
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 147
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2166373223
- Cited by
- 512
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 13.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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