On Allocative Distortions in Problems of Self-Selection
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article considers the general structure of self-selection models. By imposing conditions which permit the ordering of agents by their preferences, we provide a characterization of the distortions inherent in the sorting process.
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Citations
Cites
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information
Rothschild, M., & Stiglitz, J. (1976) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885326 · Cited by 4,987
Mussa, M., & Rosen, S. (1978) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(78)90085-6 · Cited by 3,306
Cited by
Price-Induced Patterns of Competition
Blattberg, R. C., & Wisniewski, K. J. (1989) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.8.4.291 · Cited by 664
Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation
Armstrong, M., & Sappington, D. E. M. (2007) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03027-5 · Cited by 420
Ends against the middle: Determining public service provision when there are private alternatives
Epple, D., & Romano, R. E. (1996) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(95)01540-x · Cited by 415
An Empirical Examination of Information Barriers to Trade in Insurance
Cawley, J., & Philipson, T. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.827 · Cited by 355
Chapter 10 Price discrimination
Varian, H. R. (1989) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(89)01013-7 · Cited by 343
Courty, P., & Hao, L. (2000) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00150 · Cited by 332
Licensing Tacit Knowledge: Intellectual Property Rights And The Market For Know-How
Arora, A. (1995) · Economics of Innovation and New Technology · doi:10.1080/10438599500000013 · Cited by 304
Epple, D., & Platt, G. J. (1998) · Journal of Urban Economics · doi:10.1006/juec.1996.2030 · Cited by 281
Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
Mailath, G. J. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913560 · Cited by 260
Matthews, S., & Moore, J. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913245 · Cited by 218
Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
Segal, I. (2003) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00114-5 · Cited by 164
“In both these cases, the agents’ incentive and participation constraints can be analyzed using standard ideas from the theory of second-degree price discrimination [5,10,20].”
BackgroundMethodToward a Synthesis of Models of Regulatory Policy Design with Limited Information
Armstrong, M., & Sappington, D. E. M. (2004) · Journal of Regulatory Economics · doi:10.1023/b:rege.0000028011.71612.70 · Cited by 36
“See Cooper (1984) for details.”
Metadata
- Authors
- Cooper, R.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1984
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 568
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2000135163
- Cited by
- 148
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 12.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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