Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
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Citations
Cites
Monderer, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1996) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1996.0044 · Cited by 3,543
Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1980) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003400 · Cited by 3,098
Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities
Katz, M. L., & Shapiro, C. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261409 · Cited by 2,622 · cited 7×
“Network externalities (Katz and Shapiro [18], Ellison and Fudenberg [7]): The principal is the seller of a good for which each agent (buyer) has a unit demand.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSupermodularity and Complementarity
Topkis, D. M. (2011) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400822539 · Cited by 2,138 · cited 18×
“11Similar results are obtained in [33], whose ‘‘sequential Cournot tatônnement’’ and ‘‘simultaneous Cournot tatônnement’’ correspond to Topkis’s ‘‘round-robin optimization’’ and ‘‘simultaneous optimization’’, respectively.”
BackgroundInfluentialRationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1990) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938316 · Cited by 1,804
Milgrom, P., & Shannon, C. (1994) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951479 · Cited by 1,563 · cited 1×
“Instead, the two sets can be compared using the strong (induced) set order [24,32].”
BackgroundOne-share-one-vote and the market for corporate control
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90044-x · Cited by 1,342 · cited 1×
“Specific ‘‘divide-and-conquer’’ strategies have been suggested for the use by an incumbent firm to coordinate buyers on accepting exclusive contracts [13,30], by an inferior raider to coordinate shareholders on a takeover equilibrium [9], by a leading bank to coordinate investments in a developing economy [6], by an I…”
BackgroundNash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
Maskin, E. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00076 · Cited by 1,180 · cited 1×
“This trick, which is similar to the use of noncompactness in implementation theory pioneered by Maskin’s integer games [19], does not seem appealing in our context.”
MethodMonopoly with Incomplete Information
Maskin, E., & Riley, J. (1984) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555674 · Cited by 1,140 · cited 2×
“In both these cases, the agents’ incentive and participation constraints can be analyzed using standard ideas from the theory of second-degree price discrimination [5,10,20].”
BackgroundMethodCoalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts
Bernheim, B. D., Peleg, B., & Whinston, M. D. (1987) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(87)90099-8 · Cited by 1,036
Cited by
Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers
Caillaud, B., & Jullien, B. (2003) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1593720 · Cited by 1,799
Chapter 31 Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects
Farrell, J., & Klemperer, P. (2007) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03031-7 · Cited by 1,061
Winter, E. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828041464434 · Cited by 224
NEGATIVE INTRA‐GROUP EXTERNALITIES IN TWO‐SIDED MARKETS*
Belleflamme, P., & Toulemonde, E. (2009) · International Economic Review · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2354.2008.00529.x · Cited by 119
Metadata
- Authors
- Segal, I.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2003-12
- Volume
- 113
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 147-181
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2031545250
- Cited by
- 164
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 6.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Segal, I. (2003). Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer? Journal of Economic Theory. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00114-5
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.