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Banking (Conservatively) with Optimists
Open accessAbstract
Commercial banks frequently encounter optimistic entrepreneurs whose perceptions are biased by wishful thinking. Bankers are left with a difficult screening problem: sepa-rating realistic entrepreneurs from optimists who may be clever, knowledgeable, and completely sincere. We build a game-theoretic model of the screening process. We show that although entrepreneurs may practice self-restraint to signal realism, com-petition may lead banks to be insufficiently conservative in their lending, thus reducing capital-market efficiency. High collateral requirements decrease efficiency further. We discuss bank regulation and bankruptcy rules in connection with the problems that optimistic entrepreneurs present. 1.
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Citations
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Self-citationLocal Social Capital and Entrepreneurship
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Metadata
- Authors
- Manove, M., & Padilla, A. J.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1999
- Volume
- 30
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 324
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1992194950
- Cited by
- 187
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 10.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.