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Cited by 358

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets

Open access
de Meza, David, Webb, David C.·2001·The RAND Journal of Economics
DOI 10.2307/2696408
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Abstract

This article reverses the standard conclusion that asymmetric information plus competition results in insufficient insurance provision. Risk-tolerant individuals take few precautions and are disinclined to insure, but they are drawn into a pooling equilibrium by the low premiums created by the presence of safer, more risk-averse types. Taxing insurance drives out the reckless clients, allowing a strict Pareto gain. This result depends on administrative costs in processing claims and issuing policies, as does the novel finding of a pure-strategy, partial-pooling, subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in the insurance market. Copyright 2001 by the RAND Corporation.

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Metadata

Authors
de Meza, D., & Webb, D. C.
Venue
The RAND Journal of Economics
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2001
Volume
32
Issue
2
Pages
249
ISSN
0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.2307/2696408
OpenAlex
W1976598038
Cited by
358
References
18
FWCI
11.63
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2696408
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de Meza, D., & Webb, D. C. (2001). Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets. The RAND Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/2696408

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.