Why is a Wing Like a Spoon? A Pluralist Theory of Function
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Abstract
Rejetant l'idee commune selon laquelle une theorie generale de la fonction est possible sans reference a la fonctionalite de l'artefact, d'une part, et selon laquelle cette theorie peut s'appliquer aux artefacts apres quelques ajustements, d'autre part, l'A. defend la position d'une theorie pluraliste de la fonction fondee sur deux conceptions de la fonction: l'une comme fonction-systeme definie par L. Wright, l'autre comme fonction-propre definie par R. Cummins. Examinant la critique du pluralisme developpee par Millikan a partir des notions d'adaptation et d'exaptation, l'A. montre que la fonction-systeme et la fonction-propre jouent un role egal dans le domaine des artefacts, a condition d'imposer a la theorie pluraliste quelques revisions et extensions
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Citations
Cited by
Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics
(2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198801856.001.0001 · Cited by 482
Bullot, N. J., & Reber, R. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000489 · Cited by 381
Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception
Matthen, M. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199268509.001.0001 · Cited by 333
THOMASSON, A. L. (2003) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00309.x · Cited by 317
What Biological Functions Are and Why They Matter
Garson, J. (2019) · doi:10.1017/9781108560764 · Cited by 239
A Taxonomy of Cognitive Artifacts: Function, Information, and Categories
Heersmink, R. (2013) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-013-0148-1 · Cited by 164
Fasoli, M. (2018) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-017-0363-2 · Cited by 49
“Investigating the metaphysical structure of cognitive artifacts, Heersmink (2014) develops a pluralistic notion of functions, grounded in the previous analysis by Preston (1998, 2013), in which a distinction is made between the proper function and the system function.”
BackgroundFasoli, M. (2018) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-018-9476-3 · Cited by 19
Metadata
- Authors
- Preston, B.
- Venue
- The Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 1998-05
- Volume
- 95
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 215
- ISSN
- 0022-362X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W110118889
- Cited by
- 304
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 14.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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