The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis
Abstract
This article investigates hypotheses generated by the veto players' theory. The fundamental insight of this theory is that an increase in the number of veto players (for all practical purposes, in parliamentary systems the number of parties in government) and their ideological distance from one another will reduce the ability of both government and parliament to produce significant laws. In addition, the number of significant laws increases with the duration of a government and with an increase in the ideological difference between current and previous government. These propositions are tested with legislative data (both laws and government decrees) on working time and working conditions identified in two legislative sources: the NATLEX computerized database in Geneva (produced by the International Labour organization) and Blanpain's International Encyclopedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations.The data cover fifteen West European countries for the period 1981–91. The evidence corroborates the proposed hypotheses.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity
White, H. (1980) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912934 · Cited by 25,861
Econometric Models and Economic Forecasts
Pindyck, R. S., & Rubinfeld, D. L. (1990) · eYLS (Yale Law School) · Cited by 4,973
International Labour Organization
(2022) · Permanent Missions to the United Nations · doi:10.18356/9789210018289c229 · Cited by 4,331
On the Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Moore, B. (1984) · Critique and Anti-Critique · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-86027-2_4 · Cited by 2,694
Tsebelis, G. (1995) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123400007225 · Cited by 2,605
Self-citationDemocracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries
LIJPHART, A. (1984) · Yale University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctt1ww3w2t · Cited by 2,165
Political Parties Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State
Duverger, M. (1964) · Cited by 2,109
Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies
(1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625671 · Cited by 1,395
Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism
(1999) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139175050 · Cited by 1,279
(2010) · When Political Parties Die · doi:10.5040/9798216034957.ch-002 · Cited by 990
Multiparty government: The politics of coalition in Europe
(1991) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/0261-3794(91)90033-o · Cited by 966
Laver, M., & Hunt, W. B. (1992) · Cited by 940
Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Budget Deficits: Evidence from the States
Alt, J. E., & Lowry, R. C. (1994) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082709 · Cited by 932
Minority government and majority rule
DeLue, S. M. (1991) · History of European Ideas · doi:10.1016/0191-6599(91)90164-t · Cited by 918
Left–Right Political Scales: Some ‘Expert’ Judgments
Castles, F. G., & Mair, P. (1984) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.1984.tb00080.x · Cited by 909
Multiparty government: the politics of coalition in Europe
(1991) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.28-6457 · Cited by 627
Mughan, A. (1991) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1963919 · Cited by 595
The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies
Huber, J. D. (1996) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082884 · Cited by 463
Coalitions in Parliamentary Government
Levine, S., & Dodd, L. C. (1977) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/448225 · Cited by 460
Mayhew, D. R. (1991) · Cited by 459
Tsebelis, G., & Money, J. (1997) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609350 · Cited by 429
Self-citationNeeded: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States
Sundquist, J. L. (1988) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2150899 · Cited by 320
HALLERBERG, M., & BASINGER, S. (1998) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414098031003003 · Cited by 317
The Politics of divided government
(1992) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.29-5373 · Cited by 239
Marterbauer, M. (1994) · New Economy · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0041.1994.tb00215.x · Cited by 223
Bawn, K. (1999) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2991832 · Cited by 150
MISSING-VALUE, M.-V. (2018) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315544427-1 · Cited by 149
Federalism and Central bank Independence: The Politics of German Monetary Policy, 1957–92
Lohmann, S. (1998) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887100012867 · Cited by 126
The politics of European federalism
Bednar, J., Ferejohn, J., & Garrett, G. (1996) · International Review of Law and Economics · doi:10.1016/0144-8188(96)00020-8 · Cited by 66
Cited by
Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work
Giné, V. L., & Tsebelis, G. (2003) · Reis · doi:10.2307/40184562 · Cited by 3,359
Self-citationWhy There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik
FOLLESDAL, A., & HIX, S. (2006) · JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.2006.00650.x · Cited by 1,718
The institutional environment for infrastructure investment
Henisz, W. J. (2002) · Industrial and Corporate Change · doi:10.1093/icc/11.2.355 · Cited by 888
The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization
Treisman, D. (2007) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511619151 · Cited by 800
Global Capital and National Governments
Mosley, L. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511615672 · Cited by 617
Metadata
- Authors
- Tsebelis, G.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1999-09
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 591-608
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2079352375
- Cited by
- 645
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 149.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.