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Cited by 126

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Federalism and Central bank Independence: The Politics of German Monetary Policy, 1957–92

Lohmann, Susanne·1998·World Politics
DOI 10.1017/s0043887100012867
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Abstract

Two channels of political control allow elected politicians to influence monetary policy. First, political threats to the status, structure, or very existence of the central bank may force central bankers to comply with politically motivated demands on monetary policy. Second, politicians may use their powers of appointment to ensure diat central bank appointees share their electoral and party-political goals. This paper derives the monetary policy outcomes obtained as a function of me degree of central bank independence (zero, partial, or full) and central bankers' types (partisans or technocrats). Based on a case study of the 1957 and 1992 institutional changes to the German central banking system and a regression analysis covering the period in between, the author argues that the formal independence of the system is protected by its embeddedness in the institutions of German federalism and by the federalist components of its decentralized organizational structure. The behavioral independence of the German central bank fluctuates over time with the party control of federalist veto points. The Bundesbank is staffed with nonpartisan technocrats who are partially insulated from political pressures.

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Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Lohmann, S.
Venue
World Politics
Publisher
Project MUSE
Published
1998-04
Volume
50
Issue
3
Pages
401-446
ISSN
  • 0043-8871
  • 1086-3338
DOI
10.1017/s0043887100012867
Cited by
126
References
2
Language
en
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 4821 d)

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Federalism and Central bank Independence: The Politics of German Monetary Policy, 1957–92. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s0043887100012867
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Lohmann, S. (1998). Federalism and Central bank Independence: The Politics of German Monetary Policy, 1957–92. World Politics. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0043887100012867

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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