The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Political Explanation of Variations in Central Bank Independence
Abstract
Although central banks possess a similar function across the industrial democracies, their institutional structures—their levels of independence—differ greatly. My explanation of this variation emphasizes the informational asymmetries of monetary policymaking. Government ministers have informational advantages in the policy process, potentially creating conflicts with backbench legislators and, in a multiparty government, coalition partners. An independent central bank can help alleviate these conflicts. Politicians will choose an independent bank (1) if government ministers, party legislators, and coalition partners have different monetary policy incentives and (2) if government ministers fear that party legislators and coalition partners will withdraw their support over a policy dispute. I statistically test the argument against the cross-national variation of central bank institutions. I also use the theoretical framework to examine episodes of institutional choice and reform in Germany, Britain, and Italy.
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Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential Data and Sources of Collinearity
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The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
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Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms
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Cited by
Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work
Giné, V. L., & Tsebelis, G. (2003) · Reis · doi:10.2307/40184562 · Cited by 3,359
Mapping the Ideological Marketplace
Bonica, A. (2014) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12062 · Cited by 680
Gilardi, F. (2002) · Journal of European Public Policy · doi:10.1080/1350176022000046409 · Cited by 498
Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes
Broz, J. L. (2002) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081802760403801 · Cited by 301
“Plata o Plomo?”:Bribe and Punishment in a Theory of Political Influence
DAL BÓ, E., DAL BÓ, P., & DI TELLA, R. (2006) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055406061995 · Cited by 264
Metadata
- Authors
- Bernhard, W.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1998-06
- Volume
- 92
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 311-327
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W1991926806
- Cited by
- 249
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 49.69
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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