The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power and Distributive Politics
Abstract
It is often argued that executive powers such as the veto serve to reduce particularistic spending by the legislature. I argue that the effect of the executive veto depends strongly on assumptions about both the nature of executive preferences and the institutional structure of executive-legislative bargaining. To support these claims, I develop a model of distributive policymaking subject to an executive veto. This framework incorporates variation in presidential objectives and formal powers into a dynamic bargaining model. In equilibrium, stronger veto power leads to a lower level of distributive spending, but the effects are mitigated to the extent that the president prefers spending in some districts over others. The model also generates new insights and predictions about fiscal policy under the separation of powers, including the effects of divided government, electoral rules, and term limitations for the executive.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Failure of Presidential Democracy
Linz, J. (1994) · doi:10.56021/9780801846397 · Cited by 833
Cited by
The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending
BERRY, C. R., BURDEN, B. C., & HOWELL, W. G. (2010) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055410000377 · Cited by 377
Allocating the U.S. Federal Budget to the States: The Impact of the President
Larcinese, V., Rizzo, L., & Testa, C. (2006) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00419.x · Cited by 268
Understanding the Adoption of Voter Identification Laws in the American States
Biggers, D. R., & Hanmer, M. J. (2017) · American Politics Research · doi:10.1177/1532673x16687266 · Cited by 100
The arsenal of democracy: Production and politics during WWII
Rhode, P. W., Snyder, Jr., & Strumpf, K. (2018) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.08.010 · Cited by 14
Metadata
- Authors
- McCarty, N. M.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2000-03-01
- Volume
- 94
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 117-129
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2070847856
- Cited by
- 170
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 7.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power and Distributive Politics. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2586384
- The paper
- McCarty, N. M. (2000). Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power and Distributive Politics. American Political Science Review. https://doi.org/10.2307/2586384
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.