The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty Fit the Crime?
Abstract
Models of the enforcement-compliance relationship have assumed that both the probability and magnitude of fines are independent choice variables of policy makers. These models indicate that it may be optimal to monitor with low frequency but to inflict uniformly maximal penalties for all infractions detected. This article shows that if the judicial system is built on the "reasonable doubt test, " then the penalty and the probability of conviction are not independent. In particular, as the penalty increases, the probability of conviction falls. As a result, uniformly maximal penalties may actually encourage crime rather than deter it. This article shows that optimal fines should rise with the severity of the infraction, that is, the penalty should "fit the crime."
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Cites
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
Becker, G. S. (1968) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259394 · Cited by 13,999
Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device
Shapiro, C., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1986) · Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511559594.004 · Cited by 4,652
Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?
Lazear, E. P. (1979) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260835 · Cited by 2,038
An Economic Analysis of the Courts
Landes, W. M. (1971) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466704 · Cited by 780
Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process
Tribe, L. H. (1971) · Harvard Law Review · doi:10.2307/1339610 · Cited by 615
Extra-Legal Attributes and Criminal Sentencing: An Assessment of a Sociological Viewpoint
Hagan, J. (1974) · Law & Society Review · doi:10.2307/3053080 · Cited by 442
An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law
Posner, R. A. (1985) · Columbia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1122392 · Cited by 434
Posner, R. A. (1982) · Michigan Law Review · doi:10.2307/1288259 · Cited by 406
Monitoring vis-a-vis Investigation in Enforcement of Law
Mookherjee, D., & Png, I. (1992) · American Economic Review · Cited by 185
Employee Crime and the Monitoring Puzzle
Dickens, W. T., Katz, L. F., Lang, K., & Summers, L. H. (1989) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/298211 · Cited by 177
Cited by
The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
Polinsky, A. M., & Shavell, S. (2000) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.38.1.45 · Cited by 1,159
Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century
Nagin, D. S. (1998) · Crime and Justice · doi:10.1086/449268 · Cited by 947
The Role of Wages and Auditing during a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires
Di Tella, R., & Schargrodsky, E. (2003) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/345578 · Cited by 620
An equilibrium model of incentive contracts in the presence of information manipulation
Goldman, E., & Slezak, S. L. (2006) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.05.007 · Cited by 466
Metadata
- Authors
- Andreoni, J.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1991
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 385
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1987694643
- Cited by
- 266
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 4.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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