The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations, and Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank
Abstract
We model systemic risk in an interbank market. Banks face liquidity needs as consumers are uncertain about where they need to consume. Interbank credit lines allow to cope with these liquidity shocks while reducing the cost of maintaining reserves. However, the interbank market exposes the system to a coordination failure (gridlock equilibrium) even if all banks are solvent. When one bank is insolvent, the stability of the banking system is affected in various ways depending on the patterns of payments across locations. We investigate the ability of the banking system to withstand the insolvency of one bank and whether the closure of one bank generates a chain reaction on the rest of the system. We analyze the coordinating role of the Central Bank in preventing payments systemic repercussions and we examine the justification of the Too-big-to-fail-policy.
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Citations
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Cited by
Contagion in financial networks
Gai, P., & Kapadia, S. (2010) · Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspa.2009.0410 · Cited by 1,163
Competition and Financial Stability
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Network topology of the interbank market
Boss, M., Elsinger, H., Summer, M., & Thurner, S. (2004) · Quantitative Finance · doi:10.1080/14697680400020325 · Cited by 818
Liaisons dangereuses: Increasing connectivity, risk sharing, and systemic risk
Battiston, S., Delli Gatti, D., Gallegati, M., Greenwald, B., & Stiglitz, J. E. (2012) · Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control · doi:10.1016/j.jedc.2012.04.001 · Cited by 734
Estimating bilateral exposures in the German interbank market: Is there a danger of contagion?
Upper, C., & Worms, A. (2004) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2003.12.009 · Cited by 665
Metadata
- Authors
- Freixas, X., Parigi, B. M., & Rochet, J.-C.
- Venue
- Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2000-08
- Volume
- 32
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 611
- ISSN
- 0022-2879 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1559496943
- Cited by
- 1,379
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 24.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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