The DOI matches its Crossref record; 64 of the 64 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Institutionalized Action and Corporate Governance: The Reliance on Rules of CEO Succession
Abstract
This paper follows an institutional theory of action in exploring the consequences of formal and informal rules on the chief executive officer (CEO) succession process. An analysis of the competing risks of insider versus outsider CEO succession in U.S. industrial corporations provides evidence that boards rely on both past precedents and formal internal labor markets for executive succession and the selection of insiders versus outsiders as CEOs. To exclude alternative explanations that view rules as epiphenomenal, I examine the moderating effects of performance, late CEO departures, the founder's power, and board structure on reliance on rules. The results show substantial inertia in the rules of CEO succession, consistent with an institutionalized action perspective. The findings suggest that rules both enable and constrain board decision making.
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Cites
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Cited by
Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. (1999) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/210361 · Cited by 3,232
Self-citationPhillips, N., Lawrence, T. B., & Hardy, C. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159075 · Cited by 1,669
THE NORMALIZATION OF CORRUPTION IN ORGANIZATIONS
Ashforth, B. E., & Anand, V. (2003) · Research in Organizational Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0191-3085(03)25001-2 · Cited by 1,510
The Behavioral Theory of the Firm: Assessment and Prospects
Gavetti, G., Greve, H. R., Levinthal, D. A., & Ocasio, W. C. (2012) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.1080/19416520.2012.656841 · Cited by 897
Self-citationDecoupling Policy from Practice: The Case of Stock Repurchase Programs
Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. (2001) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2667086 · Cited by 814
Metadata
- Authors
- Ocasio, W.
- Venue
- Administrative Science Quarterly
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1999-06
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 384-416
- ISSN
- 0001-8392 (ISSN-L)
- 1930-3815
- OpenAlex
- W1986877649
- Cited by
- 309
- References
- 64
- FWCI
- 32.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.