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Cited by 309

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 64 of the 64 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Institutionalized Action and Corporate Governance: The Reliance on Rules of CEO Succession

Ocasio, William·1999·Administrative Science Quarterly

Abstract

This paper follows an institutional theory of action in exploring the consequences of formal and informal rules on the chief executive officer (CEO) succession process. An analysis of the competing risks of insider versus outsider CEO succession in U.S. industrial corporations provides evidence that boards rely on both past precedents and formal internal labor markets for executive succession and the selection of insiders versus outsiders as CEOs. To exclude alternative explanations that view rules as epiphenomenal, I examine the moderating effects of performance, late CEO departures, the founder's power, and board structure on reliance on rules. The results show substantial inertia in the rules of CEO succession, consistent with an institutionalized action perspective. The findings suggest that rules both enable and constrain board decision making.

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Metadata

Authors
Ocasio, W.
Venue
Administrative Science Quarterly
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1999-06
Volume
44
Issue
2
Pages
384-416
ISSN
  • 0001-8392 (ISSN-L)
  • 1930-3815
OpenAlex
W1986877649
Cited by
309
References
64
FWCI
32.28
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Institutionalized Action and Corporate Governance: The Reliance on Rules of CEO Succession. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2667000
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Ocasio, W. (1999). Institutionalized Action and Corporate Governance: The Reliance on Rules of CEO Succession. Administrative Science Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.2307/2667000

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.