The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies
Abstract
ment of an empirical tradition that allows scholars to evaluate the relative importance of competing theories. We resolve this problem by applying an empirical framework that is appropriate for modeling coalition choice to evaluate several leading explanations of government formation. Our approach allows us to make conclusions about the relative importance of traditional variables relating to size and ideology and to assess the impact of recent new-institutional-
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work
Giné, V. L., & Tsebelis, G. (2003) · Reis · doi:10.2307/40184562 · Cited by 3,359
Red Media, Blue Media: Evidence of Ideological Selectivity in Media Use
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Bäck, H., Debus, M., & Dumont, P. (2011) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2010.01980.x · Cited by 315
The Executive Toolbox: Building Legislative Support in a Multiparty Presidential Regime
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Short versus Long Coalitions: Electoral Accountability and the Size of the Public Sector
Bawn, K., & Rosenbluth, F. (2006) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00182.x · Cited by 287
Metadata
- Authors
- Martin, L. W., & Stevenson, R. T.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2001-01
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 33
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2116765065
- Cited by
- 536
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 19.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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