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Cited by 268

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems

Baron, D. P., Diermeier, D. · 2001 · The Quarterly Journal of Economics

Abstract

This paper presents a theory of parliamentary systems with a proportional representation electoral system, a formateur selected based on party representation in parliament, and parties that cannot commit to the policies they will implement once in government. Government formation involves efficient proto-coalition bargaining, and elections yield unique strong Nash equilibrium outcomes. Depending on the status quo, minimal-majority, surplus, or consensus governments can form. If parties and voters are myopic and the status quo is subject to shocks, consensus governments and centrist policies occur only in a crisis. Otherwise, governments are minimal winning, and policies reflect only the preferences of the government parties.

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Crossref · 10.1162/00335530152466278

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Metadata

Authors
Baron, D. P., & Diermeier, D.
Venue
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Published
2001-08-01
Volume
116
Issue
3
Pages
933-967
ISSN
  • 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-4650
OpenAlex
W2166060511
Cited by
268
References
25
FWCI
10.74
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1162/00335530152466278
The paper
Baron, D. P., & Diermeier, D. (2001). Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1162/00335530152466278

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.