The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems
Abstract
This paper presents a theory of parliamentary systems with a proportional representation electoral system, a formateur selected based on party representation in parliament, and parties that cannot commit to the policies they will implement once in government. Government formation involves efficient proto-coalition bargaining, and elections yield unique strong Nash equilibrium outcomes. Depending on the status quo, minimal-majority, surplus, or consensus governments can form. If parties and voters are myopic and the status quo is subject to shocks, consensus governments and centrist policies occur only in a crisis. Otherwise, governments are minimal winning, and policies reflect only the preferences of the government parties.
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Cites
(2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.5.i · Cited by 15,100
Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems
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Self-citationA Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt
Alesina, A., & Tabellini, G. (1990) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2298021 · Cited by 1,568
Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies
(1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625671 · Cited by 1,395
The Two-party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science
Riker, W. H. (1982) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400189580 · Cited by 995
Multiparty government: The politics of coalition in Europe
(1991) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/0261-3794(91)90033-o · Cited by 966
Myles, G. D. (1993) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/0176-2680(93)90012-j · Cited by 875
American political science review
(1983) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/0261-3794(83)90139-7 · Cited by 839
Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence
Calvert, R. L. (1985) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111212 · Cited by 825
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Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility
BÉNABOU, R., & TIROLE, J. (2010) · Economica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.2009.00843.x · Cited by 2,237
Electoral Systems and Public Spending
Milesi-Ferretti, G. M., Perotti, R., & Rostagno, M. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302753650346 · Cited by 716
Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies
Martin, L. W., & Stevenson, R. T. (2001) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669358 · Cited by 536
When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancingin Parliamentary Elections
KEDAR, O. (2005) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055405051592 · Cited by 389
Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies
Persson, T., Roland, G., & Tabellini, G. (2007) · Quarterly Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1561/100.00006019 · Cited by 359
Metadata
- Authors
- Baron, D. P., & Diermeier, D.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2001-08-01
- Volume
- 116
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 933-967
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2166060511
- Cited by
- 268
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 10.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.