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Cited by 411Healthcare Policy and ManagementHealthcare Systems and ReformsInsurance and Financial Risk Management

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Asymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey

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Cardon, James H., Hendel, Igal·2001·The RAND Journal of Economics
DOI 10.2307/2696362
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Abstract

Adverse selection is perceived to be a major source of market failure in insurance markets. There is little empirical evidence on the extent of the problem. We estimate a structural model of health insurance and health care choices using data on single individuals from the NMES. A robust prediction of adverse-selection models is that riskier types buy more coverage and, on average, end up using more care. We test for unobservables linking health insurance status and health care consumption. We find no evidence of informational asymmetries.

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Crossref · 10.2307/2696362

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Metadata

Authors
Cardon, J. H., & Hendel, I.
Affiliations
Brigham Young University (US)
ORCID
Cardon, James H.
Venue
The RAND Journal of Economics
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2001
Volume
32
Issue
3
Pages
408
ISSN
0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.2307/2696362
OpenAlex
W2044293638
Cited by
411
References
19
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 11 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 17 · 2019: 17 · 2018: 22 · 2017: 23 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 31 · 2014: 17 · 2013: 25 · 2012: 29
FWCI
18.13
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1 (tdm, 5356 d)
Locations
  • The RAND Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Healthcare Policy and Management
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health › Healthcare Systems and Reforms
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Insurance and Financial Risk Management
Keywords
adverse selection, information asymmetry, health insurance, health care utilization, insurance coverage, market failure, National Medical Expenditure Survey
MeSH terms
Data Collection, Health Expenditures, Health Status, Humans, Insurance, Health, Models, Theoretical, United States, Medically Uninsured, Information Management, Health Care Surveys

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