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Asymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey
Open accessAbstract
Adverse selection is perceived to be a major source of market failure in insurance markets. There is little empirical evidence on the extent of the problem. We estimate a structural model of health insurance and health care choices using data on single individuals from the NMES. A robust prediction of adverse-selection models is that riskier types buy more coverage and, on average, end up using more care. We test for unobservables linking health insurance status and health care consumption. We find no evidence of informational asymmetries.
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“Cardon and Hendel (2001) find no evidence of selection based on private information”
From Health Insurance for “Humans”: Information Frictions, Plan Choice, and Consumer Welfare (2015) · cites this paper as Cardon and Hendel (2001)
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Metadata
- Authors
- Cardon, J. H., & Hendel, I.
- Affiliations
- Brigham Young University (US)
- ORCID
- Cardon, James H.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2001
- Volume
- 32
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 408
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2044293638
- Cited by
- 411
- References
- 19
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 11 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 17 · 2019: 17 · 2018: 22 · 2017: 23 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 31 · 2014: 17 · 2013: 25 · 2012: 29
- FWCI
- 18.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- papers.ssrn.com
- Locations
- The RAND Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Healthcare Policy and Management
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health › Healthcare Systems and Reforms
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Insurance and Financial Risk Management
- Keywords
- adverse selection, information asymmetry, health insurance, health care utilization, insurance coverage, market failure, National Medical Expenditure Survey
- MeSH terms
- Data Collection, Health Expenditures, Health Status, Humans, Insurance, Health, Models, Theoretical, United States, Medically Uninsured, Information Management, Health Care Surveys
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