The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory
Abstract
The paper is a discussion of the interpretation of game theory. The first half of the paper deals with the notion of "strategy". The paper endorses the view that equilibrium strategy describes a player's plan of action, as well as those considerations which support the optimality of his plan rather than being merely described as a "plan of action". In the second half of the paper it is argued that a good model in game theory has to be realistic in the sense that it provides a model for the perception of real life social phenomena. It should incorporate a description of the relevant factors involved, as perceived by the decision makers. Copyright 1991 by The Econometric Society.
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Citations
Cites
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Rubinstein, A. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912531 · Cited by 5,264
Self-citationNash, J. (1953) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1906951 · Cited by 3,177
Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations
Harsanyi, J. C. (1977) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511571756 · Cited by 1,431
Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
Pearce, D. G. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911197 · Cited by 1,407
On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
Kohlberg, E., & Mertens, J.-F. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912320 · Cited by 1,397
Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
Bernheim, B. D. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911196 · Cited by 1,291
Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
Harsanyi, J. C. (1973) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01737554 · Cited by 887
16. Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games
Aumann, R. J. (1959) · Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-40), Volume IV · doi:10.1515/9781400882168-018 · Cited by 886
Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
Rubinstein, A. (1986) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(86)90021-9 · Cited by 594
Self-citationAdaptive Behavior and Economic Theory
Lucas, Jr. (1986) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296377 · Cited by 468
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The Politics of Authoritarian Rule
Svolik, M. W. (2012) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139176040 · Cited by 2,611
A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change
GREIF, A., & LAITIN, D. D. (2004) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055404041395 · Cited by 1,096
Maskin, E., & Tirole, J. (2001) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.2000.2785 · Cited by 808
Evolution of the Social Contract
Skyrms, B. (2014) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139924825 · Cited by 743
Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
Aumann, R. J., & Brandenburger, A. (2016) · Readings in Formal Epistemology · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_41 · Cited by 635
Metadata
- Authors
- Rubinstein, A.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1991-07
- Volume
- 59
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 909
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2069734817
- Cited by
- 519
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 19.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.