The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development
Abstract
Under anarchy, uncoordinated competitive theft by “roving bandits” destroys the incentive to invest and produce, leaving little for either the population or the bandits. Both can be better off if a bandit sets himself up as a dictator—a “stationary bandit” who monopolizes and rationalizes theft in the form of taxes. A secure autocrat has an encompassing interest in his domain that leads him to provide a peaceful order and other public goods that increase productivity. Whenever an autocrat expects a brief tenure, it pays him to confiscate those assets whose tax yield over his tenure is less than their total value. This incentive plus the inherent uncertainty of succession in dictatorships imply that autocracies will rarely have good economic performance for more than a generation. The conditions necessary for a lasting democracy are the same necessary for the security of property and contract rights that generates economic growth.
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Citations
Cites
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Golembiewski, R. T., & Olson, M. (1966) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2091298 · Cited by 11,364
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Cited by
INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: CROSS‐COUNTRY TESTS USING ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES
Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1995) · Economics & Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1995.tb00111.x · Cited by 5,084
Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues
Bardhan, P. (2017) · Political Corruption · doi:10.4324/9781315126647-30 · Cited by 2,616
Democracy and dictatorship revisited
Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J., & Vreeland, J. R. (2010) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9491-2 · Cited by 2,481
Chapter 6 Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth
(2005) · Handbook of Economic Growth · doi:10.1016/s1574-0684(05)01006-3 · Cited by 2,472
Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy: (504012013-001)
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Metadata
- Authors
- Olson, M.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1993-09
- Volume
- 87
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 567-576
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2086838579
- Cited by
- 3,794
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 63.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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