The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters
Abstract
I present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies. Informed voters, however, vote based on those policies, so candidates face a trade-off between choosing a policy to generate funds to attract the uninformed vote and choosing a policy to attract the informed vote. Electoral equilibria are characterized for two categories of policies: particularistic and collective. In the case of particularistic policies, the equilibrium policies of the candidates are separated if the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently high, and the degree of separation is an increasing function of that proportion. The model is extended to include the public financing of elections and incumbency advantages. For the case of collective policies, the candidates locate at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters, and contributions are zero.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Theory of Committees and Elections.
Stuart, A., & Black, D. (1959) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2550498 · Cited by 2,822
American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory
Lowi, T. J. (1964) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2009452 · Cited by 2,498
Pfanzagl, J., & Luce, R. D. (1962) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911299 · Cited by 2,469
The Politics of Congressional Elections
Jacobson, G. C. (1983) · Cited by 1,695
Wilson, J. Q. (2021) · The Political Economy · doi:10.4324/9781315495811-9 · Cited by 1,084
Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems
Cox, G. W. (1990) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111465 · Cited by 869
Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented
Denzau, A. T., & Munger, M. C. (1986) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1957085 · Cited by 709
Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives
Wright, J. R. (1990) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1963527 · Cited by 471
Campaign Contributions as Investments: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1980-1986
Snyder (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261731 · Cited by 406
Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact
Hinich, M. J. (1977) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(77)90005-9 · Cited by 378
Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic voting
Austen-Smith, D. (1987) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00123002 · Cited by 374
Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources
Snyder, J. M. (1989) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911056 · Cited by 365
Models of strategic choice in politics
(1990) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.28-0581 · Cited by 334
Bailey, E. E., & Baron, D. P. (1994) · Journal of Policy Analysis and Management · doi:10.2307/3325105 · Cited by 311
Self-citationCampaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous Probit-Tobit Model
Chappell, H. W. (1982) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/1937945 · Cited by 297
McKelvey, R. D., & Ordeshook, P. C. (1985) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(85)90079-1 · Cited by 261
The Economics of Special Interest Politics: The Case of the Tariff
Brock, W. A., & Mageec, S. P. (2016) · American Economic Review · Cited by 244
Service-Induced Campaign Contributions and the Electoral Equilibrium
Baron, D. P. (1989) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937834 · Cited by 224
Self-citationELECTIONS AND THE THEORY OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS: A SURVEY AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS*
Morton, R., & Cameron, C. (1992) · Economics & Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1992.tb00056.x · Cited by 200
Poole, K. T., & Romer, T. (1985) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00119353 · Cited by 149
Cited by
Goldman, A. I. (1999) · doi:10.1093/0198238207.001.0001 · Cited by 2,166
Filter Bubbles, Echo Chambers, and Online News Consumption
Flaxman, S., Goel, S., & Rao, J. M. (2016) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfw006 · Cited by 1,992
Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2008) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2008.123.2.703 · Cited by 1,319
Persistence of power, Elites, and institutions
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.1.267 · Cited by 1,268
Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels
Bardhan, P., & Mookherjee, D. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.2.135 · Cited by 1,060
Metadata
- Authors
- Baron, D. P.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1994-03
- Volume
- 88
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 33-47
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2117696002
- Cited by
- 641
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 20.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.