The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Wages, Profits, and Rent-Sharing
Abstract
The paper suggests a new test for rent-sharing in the U. S. labor market. Using an unbalanced panel from the manufacturing sector, it shows that a rise in a sector's profitability leads after some years to an increase in the long-run level of wages in that sector. The paper controls for workers' characteristics, for industry fixed effects, and for unionism. Lester's range of wages is estimated, for rent-sharing reasons alone, at approximately 24 percent of the mean wage.
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Citations
Cites
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High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms
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The Structure of Wages and Investment in General Training
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Reciprocity and economics: The economic implications of Homo Reciprocans
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FIRM HETEROGENEITY AND THE LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION*
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Cross‐country Inequality Trends
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Oligopsony and Monopsonistic Competition in Labor Markets
Bhaskar, V, Manning, A., & To, T. (2002) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/0895330027300 · Cited by 395
Who Profits from Patents? Rent-Sharing at Innovative Firms*
Kline, P., Petkova, N., Williams, H., & Zidar, O. (2019) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjz011 · Cited by 384
Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity
Fehr, E., & G�chter, S. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.229149 · Cited by 374
The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies Revisited
Hagedorn, M., & Manovskii, I. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1080246 · Cited by 338
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The augmented Solow model and the African growth debate*
Hoeffler, A. E. (2002) · Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1111/1468-0084.00016 · Cited by 325
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-62745-5_7 · Cited by 303
Profit Sharing: Does It Make a Difference?
Kruse, D. L. (1993) · doi:10.17848/9780585261614 · Cited by 300
Human Resource Management and Productivity
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Dahl, C. M., le Maire, D., & Munch, J. R. (2013) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/669339 · Cited by 126
Metadata
- Authors
- Blanchflower, D. G., Oswald, A. J., & Sanfey, P.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1996-02-01
- Volume
- 111
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 227-251
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2891316439
- Cited by
- 526
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 27.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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