The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Self-Confirming Equilibrium
Abstract
Self-confirming equilibrium differs from Nash equilibrium in allowing players to have incorrect beliefs about how their opponents would play off of the equilibrium path.We provide several examples of ways that self -confirming and Nash equilibria differ.In games with "identified deviators , " all self -confirming equilibrium outcomes can be generated by extensive -form correlated equilibria.In two-player games, self -confirming equilibria with "unitary beliefs" are Nash.1.
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Citations
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Self-citation
Cited by
Drifts and volatilities: monetary policies and outcomes in the post WWII US
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Learning Through Noticing: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment *
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SELECTIVE ATTENTION AND LEARNING
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Maximization, learning, and economic behavior
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Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World
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Self-citationConjectural Equilibrium in Multiagent Learning
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fudenberg, D., & Levine, D. K.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1993-05
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 523
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2174806087
- Cited by
- 522
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 9.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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