The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Multistage Games with Communication
Abstract
This paper considers multistage games with communication mechanisms that can be implemented by a central mediator. In a communication equilibrium, no player expects ex ante to gain by manipulating his reports or actions. A sequential communication equilibrium is a communication equilibrium with a conditional probability system under which no player could ever expect to gain by manipulation, even after zero-probability events. Codominated actions are defined. It is shown that a communication equilibrium is a sequential communication equilibrium if and only if it never uses codominated actions. Predominant communication equilibria are defined by iterative elimination of codominated actions and are shown to exist.
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Citations
Cites
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Selten, R. (1975) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01766400 · Cited by 3,337
Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
Myerson, R. B. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912346 · Cited by 1,983
Self-citationSubjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies
Aumann, R. J. (1974) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8 · Cited by 1,630
11. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information
Kuhn, H. W. (1953) · Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-28), Volume II · doi:10.1515/9781400881970-012 · Cited by 913
Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems
Myerson, R. B. (1982) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(82)90006-4 · Cited by 912
Self-citationAn Approach to Communication Equilibria
Forges, F. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914304 · Cited by 383
Acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria
Myerson, R. B. (1986) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01769254 · Cited by 80
Self-citation
Cited by
Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations
(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-5662 · Cited by 1,756
(1998) · doi:10.1006/jeth.1997.2357 · Cited by 696
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1991) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(91)90155-w · Cited by 646
Information Design: A Unified Perspective
Bergemann, D., & Morris, S. (2019) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20181489 · Cited by 527
Fudenberg, D., & Levine, D. K. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951716 · Cited by 522
Metadata
- Authors
- Myerson, R. B.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1986-03
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 323
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2059191774
- Cited by
- 588
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 9.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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