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Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.
Abstract
This text argues that moral accountability hinges on questions of fairness: When is it fair to hold people morally responsible for what they do? Would it be fair to do so even in a deterministic world? To answer these questions, we need to understand what we are doing when we hold people morally responsible, a stance that Wallace connects with a central class of moral sentiments, those of resentment, indignation and guilt. To hold someone responsible, he argues, is to be subject to these reactive emotions in one's dealings with that person. Developing this theme, he offers an interpretation of the reactive emotions and traces their role in our practices of blame and moral sanction. With this account in place, Wallace advances an argument against the common view that accountability requires freedom of will. Instead, he maintains, the fairness of holding people responsible depends on their rational competence: the power to grasp moral reasons and to control their behaviour accordingly. He shows how these forms of rational competence are compatible with determinism. At the same time, giving serious consideration to incompatibilist concerns, Wallace develops a compelling diagnosis of the common assumption that freedom is necessary for responsibililty. This book touches on issues of broad concern to philosphers, legal theorists, political scientists and anyone interested in the nature and limits of responsibility.
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Citations
Cited by
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Doris, J. M. (1998) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/0029-4624.00136 · Cited by 731
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Control, responsibility, and moral assessment
Smith, A. M. (2008) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-006-9048-x · Cited by 406
Von Schomberg, R. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2436399 · Cited by 403
Recent Work on Moral Responsibility
Fischer, J. M. (1999) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/233206 · Cited by 395
Responsibility without Blame for Addiction
Pickard, H. (2017) · Neuroethics · doi:10.1007/s12152-016-9295-2 · Cited by 302
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Woolfolk, R. L., Doris, J. M., & Darley, J. M. (2006) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2005.05.002 · Cited by 275
Responsibility Without Blame: Empathy and the Effective Treatment of Personality Disorder
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Doris, J. M., & The Moral Psychology Research Group (2010) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582143.001.0001 · Cited by 227
The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility
Björnsson, G., & Persson, K. (2012) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00813.x · Cited by 81
Mental disorder and legal responsibility: The relevance of stages of decision making
Kalis, A., & Meynen, G. (2014) · International Journal of Law and Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/j.ijlp.2014.02.034 · Cited by 16
Metadata
- Authors
- Clarke, R., & Wallace, R. J.
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1997-03
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 230
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2316197745
- Cited by
- 630
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 3.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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