The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics
Abstract
We examine what determines whether an interest group will receive favors in pork-barrel politics, using a model of majority voting with two competing parties. Each group's membership is heterogeneous in its ideological affinity for the parties. Individuals face a trade-off between party affinity and their own transfer receipts. The model is general enough to yield two often-discussed but competing theories as special cases. If the parties are equally effective in delivering transfers to any group, then the outcome of the process conforms to the "swing voter" theory: both parties woo the groups that are politically central, and most willing to switch their votes in response to economic favors. If groups have party affinities, and each party is more effective in delivering favors to its own support group, then we can get the "machine politics" outcome, where each party favors its core support group. We derive these results theoretically, and illustrate their operation in particular examples.
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Citations
Cites
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Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game
Cox, G. W., & McCubbins, M. D. (1986) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2131098 · Cited by 1,274
Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel: A Generalization
Shepsle, K. A., & Weingast, B. R. (1981) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110914 · Cited by 539
Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems
Myerson, R. B. (1993) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2938819 · Cited by 472
Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency
Dixit, A., & Londregan, J. (1995) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082513 · Cited by 374
Self-citationThe Political Economy of U.S. Import Policy
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A model of political equilibrium in a representative democracy
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Models of Multiparty Electoral Competition
Shepsle, K. (2012) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203714966 · Cited by 197
Cited by
Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina
STOKES, S. C. (2005) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055405051683 · Cited by 1,586
Voting for autocracy: hegemonic party survival and its demise in Mexico
(2007) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.44-4695 · Cited by 1,155
Fajgelbaum, P. D., Goldberg, P. K., Kennedy, P. J., & Khandelwal, A. K. (2020) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjz036 · Cited by 1,030
Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot
NICHTER, S. (2008) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055408080106 · Cited by 987
The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government
Maskin, E., & Tirole, J. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828042002606 · Cited by 904
Metadata
- Authors
- Dixit, A., & Londregan, J.
- Venue
- The Journal of Politics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1996-11
- Volume
- 58
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1132-1155
- ISSN
- 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2508
- OpenAlex
- W2132667021
- Cited by
- 1,506
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 10.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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