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Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence.
Abstract
By contributing a few hundred dollars to a charity like UNICEF, a prosperous person can ensure that fewer poor children die, and that more will live reasonably long, worthwhile lives. Even when knowing this, however, most people send nothing, and almost all of the rest send little. What is the moral status of this behavior? To such common cases of letting die, our untutored response is that, while it is not very good, neither is the conduct wrong. What is the source of this lenient assessment? In this contentious new book, one of our leading philosophers argues that our intuitions about ethical cases are generated not by basic moral values, but by certain distracting psychological dispositions that all too often prevent us from reacting in accord with our commitments. Through a detailed look at how these tendencies operate, Unger shows that, on the good morality that we already accept, the fatally unhelpful behavior is monstrously wrong. By uncovering the eminently sensible ethics that we've already embraced fully, and by confronting us with empirical facts and with easily followed instructions for lessening serious suffering appropriately and effectively, Unger's book points the way to a compassionate new moral philosophy.
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Citations
Cited by
Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment
Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. A., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004 · Cited by 1,231
Principled moral sentiment and the flexibility of moral judgment and decision making
Bartels, D. M. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.001 · Cited by 435
A Model of Third Parties' Morally Motivated Responses to Mistreatment in Organizations
O'reilly, J., & Aquino, K. (2011) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2009.0311 · Cited by 223
Sauer, H. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108529181 · Cited by 72
Demandingness, Well-Being and the Bodhisattva Path
Harris, S. E. (2015) · Sophia · doi:10.1007/s11841-015-0474-0 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- Kamm, F. M., & Unger, P.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1999-04
- Volume
- 108
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 300
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2108197656
- Cited by
- 406
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 56.26
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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