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Moral Hazard and Observability
Open accessAbstract
The role of imperfect information in a principal-agent relationship subject to moral hazard is considered.A necessary and sufficient condition for imperfect information to improve on contracts based on the payoff alone is derived, and a characterization of the optimal use of such information is given.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Holmstrom, B.
- Venue
- The Bell Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1979
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 74
- ISSN
- 0361-915X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1485535210
- Cited by
- 8,311
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 27.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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