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Tax Compliance and Perceptions of the Risks of Detection and Criminal Prosecution
Abstract
In this paper we use a survey concerning a hypothetical taxpayer to analyze how certain features of the enforcement of the tax laws shape perceptions of the risks of detection and penalties for tax noncompliance. We also examine the effects of these perceptions on intended noncompliance behavior. Our findings provide strong support for various hypotheses concerning the effect of the enforcement process on perceptions. We also find, in contrast to prior results, that the perceived risk of criminal prosecution appears to act as a powerful deterrent to noncompliance. We explain why earlier studies might have failed to detect a deterrent role for the severity of punishment.
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Citations
Cited by
Bulgurcu, B., Cavusoglu, H., & Benbasat, I. (2010) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.2307/25750690 · Cited by 1,870
Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century
Nagin, D. S. (1998) · Crime and Justice · doi:10.1086/449268 · Cited by 947
Self-citationConscience, Significant Others, and Rational Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model
Grasmick, H. G., & Bursik, R. J. (1990) · Law & Society Review · doi:10.2307/3053861 · Cited by 826
Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century
Nagin, D. S. (2013) · Crime and Justice · doi:10.1086/670398 · Cited by 820
Self-citationEnduring Individual Differences and Rational Choice Theories of Crime
Nagin, D. S., & Paternoster, R. (1993) · Law & Society Review · doi:10.2307/3054102 · Cited by 750
Self-citationSanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime
Paternoster, R., & Simpson, S. (1996) · Law & Society Review · doi:10.2307/3054128 · Cited by 670
FELD, L. P., & FREY, B. S. (2007) · Law & Policy · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9930.2007.00248.x · Cited by 643
Ariel, B., Farrar, W. A., & Sutherland, A. (2015) · Journal of Quantitative Criminology · doi:10.1007/s10940-014-9236-3 · Cited by 621
Piquero, A., & Tibbetts, S. (1996) · Justice Quarterly · doi:10.1080/07418829600093061 · Cited by 504
Wenzel, M. (2002) · Journal of Applied Psychology · doi:10.1037//0021-9010.87.4.629 · Cited by 366
Individual Perceptions of the Criminal Justice System
Lochner, L. (2007) · The American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282807780323505 · Cited by 362
NAGIN, D. S., & PATERNOSTER, R. (1994) · Criminology · doi:10.1111/j.1745-9125.1994.tb01166.x · Cited by 360
Self-citationTHE DETERRENT EFFECT OF PERCEIVED CERTAINTY AND SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT REVISITED*
KLEPPER, S., & NAGIN, D. (1989) · Criminology · doi:10.1111/j.1745-9125.1989.tb01052.x · Cited by 346
Self-citationBachman, R., Paternoster, R., & Ward, S. (1992) · Law & Society Review · doi:10.2307/3053901 · Cited by 331
Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null Hypothesis
Doob, A. N., & Webster, C. M. (2003) · Crime and Justice · doi:10.1086/652230 · Cited by 314
Sanctions, Perceptions, and Crime: Implications for Criminal Deterrence
Apel, R. (2013) · Journal of Quantitative Criminology · doi:10.1007/s10940-012-9170-1 · Cited by 308
Tax evasion, civic duty and the law abiding citizen
Orviska, M., & Hudson, J. (2003) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/s0176-2680(02)00131-3 · Cited by 285
“Render Unto Caesar What Is Caesar's”: Religiosity and Taxpayers' Inclinations to Cheat
Grasmick, H. G., Bursik, R. J., & Cochran, J. K. (1991) · The Sociological Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1533-8525.1991.tb00356.x · Cited by 200
The Effect of Religiosity on Tax Fraud Acceptability: A Cross‐National Analysis
STACK, S., & KPOSOWA, A. (2006) · Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion · doi:10.1111/j.1468-5906.2006.00310.x · Cited by 148
Metadata
- Authors
- Klepper, S., & Nagin, D.
- Venue
- Law & Society Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1989
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 209-240
- ISSN
- 0023-9216 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-5893
- OpenAlex
- W1982564072
- Cited by
- 190
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 17.12
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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