The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bargaining, Mergers, and Technology Choice in Bilaterally Oligopolistic Industries
Open accessAbstract
'This paper provides a conceptual framework of multilateral bargaining in a bilaterally oligopolistic industry to analyze the motivations for horizontal mergers, technology choice, and their welfare implications. We first analyze the implication of market structure for the distribution of industry profits. We find that retailer mergers are more likely (less likely) if suppliers have increasing (decreasing) unit costs, while supplier mergers are more likely (less likely) if goods are substitutes (complements). In a second step we explore how market structure affects suppliers' technology choice, which reflects a trade-off between inframarginal and marginal production costs. We find that suppliers focus more on marginal cost reduction if (1) retailers are integrated and (2) suppliers are non-integrated. In a final step we consider the whole picture where both market structure and (subsequent) technology choice are endogenous. Analyzing the equilibrium market structure, we find cases where retailers become integrated to induce suppliers to choose a more efficient technology, even though integration weakens their bargaining position. In this case the merger benefits all parties, i.e., suppliers, retailers, and even consumers. However, we also show that the equilibrium market structure does often not maximize welfare.' (author's abstract)
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Cites
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AHERN, K. R., & HARFORD, J. (2014) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12122 · Cited by 492
Group Buying: A New Mechanism for Selling Through Social Interactions
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Insurer Competition in Health Care Markets
Ho, K., & Lee, R. (2013) · Econometrica · doi:10.3386/w19401 · Cited by 296
Controversial Role of GPOs in Healthcare‐Product Supply Chains
Hu, Q. (., & Schwarz, L. B. (2011) · Production and Operations Management · doi:10.1111/j.1937-5956.2010.01121.x · Cited by 82
Metadata
- Authors
- Inderst, R., & Wey, C.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2003
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2117947763
- Cited by
- 252
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 31.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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