Why Existence Value Should Be Used in Cost-Benefit Analysis
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Abstract
The article by Rosenthal and Nelson [1992] (hereafter RN) is intended to stimulate questions among economists and policy makers about incorporating existence values in certain public policy deliberations. These deliberations are those that seek to value the costs and benefits of particular public policies and those that serve to define damages to natural resources resulting from releases of hazardous substances or oil.' RN's evaluation of existence value follows a scattershot school of argumentation that I believe admits irrelevant and often contradictory propositions. These propositions range from the view that existence value is an ill-defined concept, to the statement that all things have existence value to someone (a seemingly concrete statement for an ill-defined concept). RN conclude that even if existence value were an appropriate component of a cost-benefit study or a natural resource damage award, we do not possess tools that can reliably measure existence value-and if we did have the tools, the task would be unmanageable anyway. In this article I address the arguments put forth by RN about existence value, cost-benefit studies, and damage awards, but my purpose is broader. I believe it is safe to say that RN are not suggesting that existence values are an illusion. They would surely agree that these values are real; that they are held by some people; and that, if the objects giving rise to these values are diminished, the well-being of these people is similarly diminished. Rather, the authors seem to be arguing that existence values are too poorly defined at present to be readily incorporated into cost-benefit studies and are difficult to measure. To discuss the definitional problems with existence values, I will place them in the context of neoclassical welfare theory and suggest that the issues raised by RN come up whenever we examine decisions about the provision of pure public goods. I hope to convince the reader that if, as economists, we can treat pure public goods within a welfare theoretic structure, we can treat existence value within the same structure. Moreover, excluding existence value from cost-benefit studies and legal proceedings would necessitate a similar exclusion of all treatments of public goods.
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Kopp, R. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1992
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 123
- ISSN
- 0276-8739 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2128792564
- Cited by
- 123
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 19.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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