Cited by 236Gender, Labor, and Family DynamicsSocial Policy and Reform StudiesEconomic Theory and Institutions

Welfare-state disincentives with endogenous habits and norms

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Lindbeck, Assar·1995·The Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Abstract

It is assumed in this paper that habits and social norms, in particular when adhered to by many, constrain the influence of changes in economic incentives on aggregate economic behavior, but that these constraints themselves may subsequently be influenced by the very same incentives. The paper is confined to disincentive effects of welfare state policies in work, saving, asset choice and entrepeneurship. Though the existence of various constraints on economic behavior usually means that changes in economic incentives influence aggregate behavior only gradually, it is argued that major shocks may drastically speed up the process.

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  • There is much circumstantial evidence and questionnaire evidence supporting the view that (dis)approval has behavioural consequences.

    “There is much circumstantial evidence and questionnaire evidence supporting the view that (dis)approval has behavioural consequences (e.g. Rainwater 1979, Lindbeck 1995, 1997).”

    From Psychological foundations of incentives (2002) · cites this paper as Lindbeck 1995

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Research works printed but not linked: 28

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  15. Lewin, K., Dembo, T., Festsinger, L. and Sears, P.S., (1944). "Level of Aspiration" in Personality and the Behavior Disorders, Vol. 1, ed. by J. McV. Hunt, Ronald Press, New York.
  16. Lewis, A. (1982), The Psychology of Taxation, Martin Robertson Press, Oxford.
  17. Lewis, D (1969), Conventions, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, Mass.
  18. —, (1988) "Consequences of the advanced welfare state", The World Economy, pp. 19-37. Also in the author's Selected Essays Vol. II, The Welfare State, Edward Elgar, London.
  19. (1995), "Hazardous Welfare State Dynamics", American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May. pp. 9-15.
  20. Magnusson, D. (1980), "Learned Helplessness", Skandinaviska Banken Quarterly Review, 67-74.
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  22. Opp, K-D. (1979), "The Emergence and Effects of Social Norms. A Confrontation of Some Hypotheses of Sociology and Economics", Kyklos, 32, pp. 775-801.
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  28. Ullmann-Margalit, E. (1977), The Emergence of Norms, Oxford, Oxford University press.

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Authors
Lindbeck, A.
Corresponding author
Lindbeck, Assar
Venue
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1995-12
Volume
97
Issue
4
Pages
477
ISSN
0347-0520 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1589985139
Cited by
236
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 4 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 8 · 2012: 9
FWCI
18.82
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
other-oa
Locations
  • Scandinavian Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • DiVA (Stockholm University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Gender Studies › Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Social Policy and Reform Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
Keywords
social norms, work incentives, savings incentives, asset choice, entrepreneurship, economic incentives, behavioral constraints

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