Reputation in Online Auctions: The Market for Trust
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Abstract
Online markets have dramatically altered the retail landscape. By eliminating barriers associated with geography as well as the physical costs of maintaining a storefront, online markets have created a democracy of buyers and sellers. However, the fluidity of this marketplace and the relative anonymity of transactions has made the of maintaining critically important. Solving the trust problem represents a key competitive advantage for many of the successful players in the online space. For instance, much of the remarkable success of eBay has stemmed from its ability to create valuable and informative reputations for its users through its system. The lock-in associated with a user's reputation on eBay helped it to stave off challenges by Amazon and Yahoo. This article describes how eBay's solution to the ''trust problem, has led to the creation of a for feedback whose sole purpose is the manufacture of reputation for eBay users. It presents a case study and a statistical analysis of this market in order to show that its maintenance represents a crucial challenge to eBay's future competitive advantage and, more generally, to solving the trust problem in other online markets.
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“Brown & Morgan (2006) show some examples of this practice on eBay's marketplace.”
From Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets (2016) · cites this paper as Brown & Morgan (2006)
Citations
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DISPUTE PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION IN ONLINE SHOPPING
Kaya, S. (2021) · DergiPark (Istanbul University)
White, M. (2012) · Duke University Press eBooks · doi:10.1215/9780822391876-008
Re-collecting Black Americana: “ABSOLUTELY DEROGATORY” OBJECTS AND NARRATIVES FROM EBAY’S COMMUNITY
(2012) · Duke University Press eBooks · doi:10.1215/9780822391876-007
(2010) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9780470874233.biblio
eBay Boys Will Be Lesbians: Viewing “Lesbian” and “Lesbian Interest” Vintage Photography Listings
(2012) · Duke University Press eBooks · doi:10.1215/9780822391876-006
White, M. (2012) · Duke University Press eBooks · doi:10.1215/9780822391876-011
eBay’s Visible Masculinities: “GAY” AND “GAY INTEREST” LISTINGS AND THE POLITICS OF DESCRIBING
(2012) · Duke University Press eBooks · doi:10.1215/9780822391876-005
(2012) · Duke University Press eBooks · doi:10.1215/9780822391876-003
Jank, W., & Shmueli, G. (2010) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9780470642603.biblio
Between Security and Distrust: EBAY’S BRAND, FAN, AND VIRTUAL COMMUNITIES
(2012) · Duke University Press eBooks · doi:10.1215/9780822391876-002
Metadata
- Authors
- Brown, J., & Morgan, J.
- ORCID
- Brown, Jennifer
- Venue
- California Management Review
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2006-10
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 61-81
- ISSN
- 0008-1256 (ISSN-L)
- 2162-8564
- OpenAlex
- W2093547363
- Cited by
- 113
- References
- 7
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 18
- FWCI
- 22.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- journals.sagepub.com/page/policies/text-and-data-mining-license (tdm)
- Locations
- California Management Review (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Access Control and Trust
- Keywords
- online auctions, reputation, trust, eBay, user feedback, digital markets, competitive advantage, lock-in, online retail
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.