The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Institutions and Economic Performance
Abstract
* Preface * Introduction Part One: History * The Impact of Administrative Power on Political and Economic Developments: Toward a Political Economy of Implementation Avner Greif * The Institutional Origins of the Industrial Revolution Joel Mokyr * Institutions and the Resource Curse in Early Modern Spain Mauricio Drelichman and Hans-Joachim Voth * Slavery, Inequality, and Economic Development in the Americas: An Examination of the Engerman-Sokoloff Hypothesis Nathan Nunn * Economic and Political Inequality in Development: The Case of Cundinamarca, Colombia Daron Acemoglu, Maria Angelica Bautista, Pablo Querubin and James Robinson Part Two: Theory * The Constitutional Choice of Bicameralism Abhinay Muthoo and Kenneth A. Shepsle * Economic Development, Insurgency, and Civil War James D. Fearon * Party Discipline and Pork-Barrel Politics Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman * Policy Persistence in Multi-Party Parliamentary Democracies Daniel Diermeier and Pohan Fong Part Three: Contemporary Evidence * Formalizing Informal Institutions: Theory and Evidence From a Kenyan Slum Siwan Anderson and Patrick Francois * Making Autocracy Work Timothy Besley and Masayuki Kudamatsu * Democracy, Technology and Growth Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina and Francesco Trebbi * The Growth Effect of Democracy: Is it Heterogeneous and How Can it Be Estimated? Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini
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Citations
Cited by
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Metadata
- Venue
- Harvard University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Harvard University Press
- Published
- 2008-11-01
- OpenAlex
- W562301940
- Cited by
- 351
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 58.63
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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